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Order Supported by Law:
The Enforcement of Rules in
Online Communities
by Nicolas Suzor*
I. INTRODUCTION
As online social spaces grow in importance, the complex relationship
between users and the private providers of the platforms continues to
raise increasingly difficult questions about legitimacy in online
governance. This Article examines two issues that go to the core of
legitimate governance in online communities: (1) how are rules enforced
and punishments imposed, and (2) how should the law support
legitimate governance and protect participants from the illegitimate
exercise of power? Because the rules of online communities are
generally backed by contractual terms of service, the imposition of
punishment for the breach of internal rules exists in a difficult
conceptual gap between criminal law and the predominantly compensa-
tory remedies of contractual doctrine. When theorists have addressed
the need for the rules of virtual communities to be enforced, a dichotomy
has generally emerged between the appropriate role of criminal law for
“real” crimes, and the private, internal resolution of “virtual” or
“fantasy” crimes. In this structure, the punitive effect of internal
measures is downplayed, and the harm that can be caused to partici-
pants by internal sanctions is systemically undervalued. At the same
time, because the contractual framework does not adequately address
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punishment, providers are struggling to use various private law
doctrines to achieve punitive ends when internal sanctions prove
ineffective. This Article addresses this conceptual gap and provides a
normative framework for enforcing community rules and imposing
punishments for their breach based upon the values of the rule of law.
Online communities, from virtual worlds to social network sites,
provide extremely popular platforms for diverse forms of social interac-
tion.1 They are used extensively for sociability, play, artistic expression,
commerce, politics, and many more constantly developing forms of social
discourse. As the importance of these spaces grows, it should come as
no surprise that tensions begin to emerge in the relationships between
the providers and the users.2 Users of online communities are seeking
to assert certain recognitions of fairness, due process, freedom of speech,
and entitlements to virtual property, most of which are typically
disclaimed in the contractual documents that purport to set the terms
of participation. Courts are increasingly being asked to determine
disputes over the contractual terms of service in virtual communities
and to resolve the interactions between the contracts,3 copyright,4 tort,5
1. See, e.g., Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATEDCOMM., no. 1 (2007), http://jcmc.india
na.edu/vol13/issue1/index.html (describing the key features of social network sites); T.L.
TAYLOR, PLAY BETWEEN WORLDS: EXPLORING ONLINE GAME CULTURE 10 (2006) (arguing
that massively multiplayer online games are “fundamentally social spaces”).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan F. Fanton, Rights and Responsibilities Online: A Paradox for Our
Times, 13 FIRST MONDAY, no. 8 (2008), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.
php/fm/article/view/2196/2012 (discussing the tension between the liberal democratic
potential of the internet and the lack of rights of participants in privately owned social
online spaces).
3. See Dan L. Burk, Authorization and Governance in Virtual Worlds, 15 FIRST
MONDAY, no. 5 (2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
viewArticle/2967/2527 (explaining that the contractual framework of virtual world
governance is being used to condition “authorization” as applicable under copyright, anti-
circumvention, tort, and criminal law).
4. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concerning the development and sale of a computer program designed to interoperate with
World of Warcraft that enabled players to cheat by automating their actions), amended and
superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 09-16044, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17,
2011).
5. See, e.g., Complaint, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07–0-
589 JVS (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/files/in_game_dollar_complaint
.pdf (concerning the sale of virtual goods against the terms of service and alleging causes
of action including tortious interference with contract and trespass to chattels); Consent
Order, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07-0589 JVS (C.D. Cal Jan.
28, 2008), http://virtuallyblind.com/files/Peons_Injunction.pdf.
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property,6 and criminal computer trespass.7 There is no easy doctrinal
solution to these emerging issues, and the inquiry is somewhat confused
by the awkward conceptual position of punishment for breaches of
private rules. The boundaries of contract and its intersection with other
private and public law doctrines, however, are of great importance in
setting the limiting bounds–the constitutive limits–of virtual community
governance.8 In analyzing these limits, a conceptual framework based
upon constitutional values is a useful tool in determining policy that will
simultaneously encourage innovation, autonomy, and legitimacy.9 I
have previously argued that the rule of law, as a contested discourse
about limits on the exercise of governance power, provides a useful
model that is more sensitive to the constitutional role of contract law in
limiting private governance and the role of other legal doctrines in
delineating freedom of contract.10 This Article develops a set of
normative principles for the enforcement of community rules based on
the values of the rule of law–particularly the avoidance of arbitrariness
and the importance of both predictability and due process, tempered by
an overarching requirement of consent. This approach provides a
method that is able to address governance tensions in the enforcement
of the rules of online communities that formal, liberal freedom of
contract principles cannot.
This Article traces a distinction between acts that are deemed to be
wrongful by territorial states, acts that merely depict wrongful acts, and
acts that are wrongful only when viewed through the interpretative
framework of the norms of particular virtual communities. The first
category of acts are already proscribed by the state and the second, in
the vast majority of cases, should not be. The third category presents
the most interesting questions. Enforcement by territorial states of
these rules can be problematic–primarily because the virtual community
lacks the legitimacy required to create rules whose breach is punishable
by the full weight of the state. In the contractual framework, breach of
6. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(concerning the confiscation of virtual property within Second Life).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (attempting to
apply the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to a person who breached the MySpace terms
of service by creating a false persona).
8. See generally Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual Communities,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1817 (2010).
9. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263,
1269 (2000); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property
in Digital Architecture, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 384 (2000).
10. See Suzor, supra note 8.
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these rules will only give rise to compensatory remedies; there is,
accordingly, a fundamental tension between the justified reluctance of
states to punish citizens for the breach of private rules and the need for
virtual communities to be able to maintain order in situations where
participants can avoid punishments for their wrongdoing.
This Article makes several normative arguments about how communi-
ty rules should be enforced in a way that encourages both autonomy and
legitimacy. Part II of this Article examines the way in which rules are
enforced within virtual communities and what limits may be imposed on
the imposition of internal punishments. I argue that the limits imposed
by contractual doctrine should be read in a way that allow providers to
enforce legitimate rules that accord with community norms but restrain
the enforcement of rules that are not sufficiently promulgated, enforced,
or consensual.
Part III examines how providers and participants are seeking to have
internal rules enforced in territorial courts and highlights the quest for
punishments that extend beyond the bounds of the community. This
part considers the interplay between virtual community contracts and
copyright, tort, and criminal law and suggests that these doctrines
should not be used to impose effectively punitive sanctions for breach of
consensual internal rules.
In Part IV, recognizing that providers will sometimes need the
assistance of territorial states in enforcing community rules, this Article
provides an argument for the use of equitable relief in a way that
encourages both legitimacy and autonomy in community governance.
This Article concludes that, while territorial states should not impose
punitive sanctions for breach of community rules, equitable relief should
be available to support legitimate community governance where internal
sanctions are ineffective.
II. INTERNAL ENFORCEMENT:
THE COMPLEX NATURE OF INTERNAL RULES
In A Rape in Cyberspace,11 Julian Dibbell famously retells an early
story of community justice in a text-based virtual world called Lambda-
MOO. The offender, Mr. Bungle, exploited an item in the virtual world
that allowed him to depict other participants being subjected to violent
sexual acts without their consent. The powerless victims could only
watch as their avatars were publicly assaulted. The bond that forms
between participants and their online identities is a complex one, and
11. JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD (1998).
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the reactions of those victims were equally complex. Dibbell explains
that the victims’ reactions were “[l]udicrously excessive” if one consid-
ered only the symbolic nature of the events, but “woefully understated”
when one considered the seriousness of corporeal sexual assault.12 The
reactions of the victims can only be understood in their existence
between the corporeal and the virtual, the disembodied area where the
depictions and social interaction is real even if it is not physical.13
Only through an experiential perspective that conceptualizes this dual
space can we hope to understand the meanings of acts and wrongs in
virtual communities.14
In response to Mr. Bungle’s actions, discussion on one of the Lambda-
MOO mailing lists turned to punishment, with widespread support for
terminating Mr. Bungle’s account–“toading” him, stripping his character
of all power to interact with the virtual world.15 At the time, the
explicit governance structure of LambdaMoo required community
consensus before the providers would take action, and this, in turn,
required extensive debate amongst the participants as to the appropriate
punishments for breaking internal rules and the procedures to be
followed for meting out those punishments. Seeing that the far-ranging
debate was unable to be resolved, an administrator of LambdaMoo,
acting alone, punished Mr. Bungle by destroying his account.16
Dibbell’s retelling raises a host of interesting issues. The big
ones–what it means to exist in the virtual, and how permeable the
boundary between the virtual and the physical really is–are contempo-
rary twists on discussions articulated by Foucault,17 Baudrillard,18
Descartes,19 and Plato,20 to name a few.21 They are questions we are
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. (“Ludicrously excessive by RL’s [real life’s] lights, woefully understated by VR’s
[virtual reality’s], the tone of exu’s response made sense only in the buzzing, dissonant gap
between them.”).
14. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210
(2007).
15. DIBBELL, supra note 11, at 24-25.
16. Id.
17. See Michel Foucault, Ceci n’est pas une pipe, 1 OCTOBER 7 (1976).
18. See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 1 (Sheila Faria Glaser trans.,
1994).
19. See RENE DESCARTES, DESCARTES: MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 21-22
(Michael Moriarty trans., 2008); see also Christine Cornell & Patrick Malcolmson, The
Matrix, Liberal Education, and Other Splinters in the Mind, 17 HUMANITAS 139, 149-50
(2004).
20. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. VII, 253-91 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1986).
21. See Jane Evelyn Mcgonigal, This Might be a Game: Ubiquitous Play and
Performance at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century 5 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D.
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still grappling with as we spend more time in virtual spaces and try to
understand what these communities mean to us. Here, however, I want
to focus on the (lack of) community consensus on how punishments are
meted out in virtual communities. When is punishment for breaking the
rules within a virtual community justified? Are there limits to the
penalties that can be imposed, or the way in which they ought to be
imposed? Importantly, when even the virtual death penalty is insuffi-
cient to deter recidivism–as when Mr. Bungle created a new account and
returned to LambdaMOO under a new identity–what else can the
community do to enforce their rules?
Take another example that Dibbell describes, years later, in another
world where two players identify a bug in Ultima Online (UO), allowing
them to purchase items from a vendor and immediately sell them back
for a quick profit.22 During the week between discovering the exploit
and reporting it to the provider, the exploiters managed to extract over
$150,000 worth of gold from the UO economy, gradually cashing it out,
undetected, over an eight-month period.23 A much less subtle example
comes from the online game Everquest II, where a group of players
found a bug that allowed them to “dupe” items on an enormous scale,
inflating the virtual economy by twenty percent overnight.24 The
exploits raised alarms and the provider, Sony Online Entertainment
(SOE), was able to trace the duped gold and ban the accounts of those
responsible, removing the inflation from the virtual economy.25
Regardless of whether exploiters can be caught, the damage they cause
can be substantial. Not only are they responsible for significant
inflation, but they also create a lot of work on the part of the customer
service teams who are tasked with responding to the problem. In many
cases, if the exploiters are quick enough, banning accounts and tracing
proceeds is too late–by that time, they may have converted their assets
and cashed out, collecting impressive windfall profits.26 At this point,
internal enforcement is largely moot; the damage has been done and
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), available at http://www.avantgame.com/
dissertation.htm.
22. JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY, OR, HOW I QUIT MY DAY JOB AND MADE MILLIONS
TRADING VIRTUAL LOOT 207 (2007).
23. Id. at 242.
24. Daniel Terdiman, Cheaters Slam ‘Everquest II’ Economy, ZDNET (Aug. 11, 2005),
http://www.zdnet.com/news/cheaters-slam-everquest-ii-economy/144176.
25. Id.
26. For an apparently firsthand account of a successful large scale dupe in Everquest
II, see Methical, EQ2: The Dog Days of Duping Cont . . ., PLAGUELANDS, http://web.archive.
org/web/20090504175837/http://plaguelands.com/eq2-dogs-duping-days-cont/ (accessed by
entering Plaquelands URL in the Internet Archive index).
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those responsible have either fled or been banned. Does the provider
have any remedy in a territorial court? Could the actions of exploiters
be criminal?
These questions have not been satisfactorily answered to date.27
There are difficult doctrinal issues both in the limitations of contract law
and the interaction of contract with tort, copyright, and criminal law.
It is important here again to distinguish between acts that are unlawful
because they are proscribed by the state (in a legitimate manner) and
acts that are only wrongs because they breach some internal community
rule. This second category is the focus of this Article: to what extent
should the law support the enforcement of consensual rules? I have
argued elsewhere that the values of the rule of law can help to better
conceptualize the competing tensions at play in virtual communities.28
The rule of law is a contested set of values about legal limitations on the
exercise of governance power that provides a useful discourse through
which to examine the legitimacy of private governance and the
imposition of punishment for breach of community rules. As a starting
point, it is useful to begin with the words of A.V. Dicey, whose articula-
tion of the rule of law requires “that no man is punishable or can be
lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of
law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts
of the land.”29 Immediately, this proposition highlights a serious
concern about the imposition of punishments by territorial states for
breaches of rules that are created, alleged, and proved by providers of
virtual communities whose legitimacy cannot be guaranteed. Because
the stakes are higher in territorial legal systems than in virtual
communities, we should take this proposition in a stronger form when
dealing with territorial law than with the internal enforcement of
27. Similar questions have been raised in illuminating articles by academic
commentators over the last decade, but theorists have not yet provided a substantive
answer. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
293 (2004) (Lastowka andHunter positing the question but leaving future regulation open).
Other commentators have focused predominantly on the virtual representation of criminal
acts or the use of virtual worlds to carry out territorial crimes. See, e.g., Gregor Allan,
Responding to Cybercrime: A Delicate Blend of the Orthodox and the Alternative, 2 N.Z. L.
REV. 149 (2005); Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 415;
Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does it Mean the End of the Child
Pornography Exception to the First Amendment?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637 (2004); see
also Caroline Meek-Prieto, Recent Development, Just Age Playing Around? How Second
Life Aids and Abets Child Pornography, 9 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 88 (2008), http://cite.nc
jolt.org/9NCJOLTOnlineEd88.
28. See Suzor, supra note 8.
29. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188
(10th ed. 1959).
C:\MYFILES\DATA\63202.1 Thu, 07-Jun-12 12:33 pm
530 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
community rules. Importantly, we should temper this argument with
the recognition of later rule of law theorists and some cyberlaw theorists
that discretion in enforcement of the rules is important for substantive
justice and to protect the autonomy of the community.30 From these
basic principles, this Article develops a normative framework for
evaluating methods of enforcing community rules and guiding the
application of contractual doctrine.
A. The Internal Enforcement of Community Rules
The rules of virtual communities are almost never enforced through
legal channels, although internal rules “invariably operate against a
background of state rules.”31 Communities usually turn to the law for
enforcement only when a breakdown occurs in community governance.32
Providers of virtual communities, in control of the software and the
networked systems that provide the platform for the community, have
almost unlimited power to enforce the rules within their respective
communities. Providers enforce rules in an array of different ways that
are highly contextually dependent on the rule, the circumstances, and
community in question.
Non-legal enforcement of rules in virtual communities happens on a
number of different levels. Most obviously, control over the software
gives providers enormous power within the community.33 Providers are
able to impose a variety of internal punishments, from warnings and
threats to suspension or expulsion from the community, including other
punishments specific to the nature of the community–like loss of
privileges, confiscation of property, or temporary incapacitation.
Providers of virtual communities usually adopt some means of
imposing sanctions on those participants they find to be breaching the
rules–ranging from a simple reprimand to suspension and eventually
cancellation of the subscriber’s account. Blizzard Entertainment’s
(Blizzard) World of Warcraft (WoW), for example, explicitly sets out a
tiered penalty policy, going so far as to quote Abraham Lincoln: “Let us
30. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE
OF LAW 15-17 (2001); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 226 (1986) (discussing law as
integrity as continuously interpretive); Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the
Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 33 (2004-2005); Edward Castronova,
The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 196 (2004-2005).
31. Greg Lastowka, Rules of Play, 4 GAMES & CULTURE 379, 388 (2009).
32. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
33. See Bartle, supra note 30, at 26-27.
C:\MYFILES\DATA\63202.1 Thu, 07-Jun-12 12:33 pm
2012] RULES IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES 531
have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end,
dare to do our duty as we understand it.”34 In the policy, Blizzard
explains that punishment is required to maintain the integrity of the
servers and to protect the experience of other participants:
[S]ometimes disciplinary action must be taken against disruptive
players who are causing damage to other’s play experiences or the
service itself. Though taking disciplinary action is never pleasant, we
must take action against certain individuals in order to maintain the
quality of service for all.35
Blizzard sets out a “pyramid” of penalties–starting at warnings for minor
infractions, moving up to suspensions of various lengths, from three
hours to three days, and to a final warning and account closure, based
upon the severity of the infraction and the participant’s prior viola-
tions.36
Most other providers do not go to such lengths to explain their
enforcement policies. Facebook, for example, merely states that if a
participant “violate[s] the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise
create[s] risk or possible legal exposure for us, we can stop providing all
or part of Facebook” to that participant.37 Many smaller communities
leave enforcement of the rules to the provider’s discretion. In all
communities, the discretion that providers have in enforcing the rules
occurs within and informs a continuous discourse about community
understandings of what is proper and just, and providers are often in a
continual struggle to shape the expectations of the community.38
In addition to direct intervention, community rules are enforced
through automated means, which are also extremely varied. Control
over the code gives providers enormous power not only to define what is
permissible within the community, but also what is possible. Providers
can directly modify the software code in order to allow or prohibit certain
types of behavior, which means that “the normative boundaries are
34. Account Penalties, BLIZZARD SUPPORT, http://us.blizzard.com/support/article.xml?
locale=en_US&articleId=20221 (last visited Aug. 22, 2011); Abraham Lincoln, Cooper Union
Address (Feb. 27, 1860).
35. Account Penalties, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, cl. 14 (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php.
38. SeeSalHumphreys,Ruling the Virtual World: Governance in Massively Multiplayer
Online Games, 11 EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD. 149 (2008) (discussing the multiple layers of
control and power relations that construct governance in virtual worlds); see also TAYLOR,
supra note 1, at 136 (discussing the way in which participants in virtual worlds can shape
social norms in a way that conflicts with the authorial vision of developers).
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inherently malleable.”39 Some rules are hard-coded into the community
platform, directly restraining participant behavior. The ability to
communicate is an important example; the design choices that are made
will influence the structure of conversations that participants can have
within the community.40 These types of restraints are variously
effective–some, like word filtering, prevent participants from using a list
of words deemed offensive in conversation with other participants but
are relatively trivial to bypass by changing spellings or using an
evolving language and dialogue.41 Other approaches are much more
effective but more limiting–like providing only a set of seemingly
innocuous options for conversation and prohibiting all other forms of
written or spoken communication within the environment.42 Where
more free-form communication is permitted, participants are often
notified that all communications occur under the watchful gaze of
omnipresent surveillance.43 The operation of code-based constraints is
obviously not limited to communication; nearly all of what is commonly
considered to be possible and much of what is considered to be accept-
able within a community is bounded by the technical rules that
constrain behavior. Because these code-based regulations are pervasive
and often go unnoticed, seemingly innocent design decisions can
39. Claude T. Aiken IV, Sources of Law and Modes of Governance: Ethnography and
Theory in Second Life, 10 PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (2009).
40. See, e.g., Mark McGuire, Ordered Communities, 7 MEDIA/CULTURE J., no. 6, ¶ 9-11
(2005), http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/06-mcquire.php (discussing the limited
textual chat, automated filtering, and surveillance culture that is aimed at making
interaction in Habbo Hotel safe for teenagers); Beth Noveck, Unchat: Democratic Solution
for a Wired World, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE 21 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) (discussing the
way in which the various design features of a purpose built chat system can influence
discourse in the context of a practical test application aimed at encouraging deliberative
discourse called “Unchat”).
41. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 40, at ¶ 9-11.
42. See, e.g., Matt Casamassina, Update: Mario Kart Wii Text Chat Details, IGN (Feb.
27, 2008), http://wii.ign.com/articles/855/855033p1.html (limiting all chat to preset menu
options); Parent’s Guide, CLUB PENGUIN, http://www.clubpenguin.com/parents/club_pen
guin_guide.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2011) (providing two chat options, “Ultimate Safe
Chat[, which] limits what users can say to a predefined menu of greetings, questions and
statements, as well as emotes, actions and greeting cards” and “Standard Safe Chat[,
which] allows players to type their own messages to other users. Every message is filtered
to allow only preapproved words and phrases, and block attempts to communicate a phone
number or other personally identifiable information.”).
43. See Christopher Dodds, Avatars and the Invisible Omniscience (Aug. 2007)
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, RMIT University), available at http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/
adt/uploads/approved/adt-VIT20080424.100301/public/02whole.pdf;McGuire, supranote40,
at ¶ 11-12.
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seriously shape the conceivable possibilities of behavior within the
environment.44
The enforcement of social norms and rules does not necessarily need
to involve the direct agency of the provider. Social norms are also
continuously enforced through participation in the community by the
participants themselves, reinforcing understandings of acceptable
behavior.45 Where there is sufficient unity of purpose and shared
ethos, members of a community can collectively generate, evolve, and
apply rules in the day-to-day activities within that community.
Wikipedia provides an example of a community that predominantly
utilizes this mode of governance, where the rules for editing are
generated through an ongoing discourse between participants, rather
than routinely enforced by an overseeing entity.46 Wikipedia provides
a formal policy detailing the ways in which a participant can be banned
from editing the encyclopedia–complete with procedures for arbitration
and appeals.47
Wikipedia has a particularly formal and visible community governance
framework–one that requires considerable effort on behalf of community
participants to create and maintain. Similar examples of real legitimate
participant-led governancemay be rare, given the difficulty of generating
and maintaining real consensus in a disparate community.48 Participa-
44. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 82-83 (1999).
45. See Sal Humphreys, Massively Multiplayer Online Games Productive Players and
Their Disruptions to Conventional Media Practices 155 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Queensland University of Technology), available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/16119/
(“Subtler forms of regulation that relate to social norms are also a part of the game, as they
are of any community. Players police each other’s behaviour.”); see also TAYLOR, supra note
1, at 36.
46. Malte Ziewitz, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Oxford, Presentation at Games
Convention Online, Leipzig (Aug. 2009); see also Christian Pentzold & Sebastian
Seidenglanz,Foucault@Wiki: First Steps Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis
of Wiki Discourses, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON WIKIS 59
(2006), http://www.interactiondesign.org/references/conferences/proceedings_of_the_2006
_international_symposium_on_Wikis.html; Andrea Forte, Vanesa Larco&AmyBruckman,
Decentralization in Wikipedia Governance, 26 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 49 (2009). It is
important to note thatWikipedia’s founder, JimmyWales, continues to hold ultimate power
over the operation of Wikipedia and is not necessarily bound by internal governance
procedures.
47. Wikipedia: Banning Policy, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, (Oct. 10, 2009,
6:14 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Banning_policy&oldid=31
9014811.
48. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory
of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) (explaining participant-led governance in the
context of the Internet Engineering Task Force and showing the difficulty of achieving
consensus).
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tory governance, however, is not always such a formal and acknowledged
endeavor. In all communities, governance occurs at the point of every
interaction between participants, as the boundaries of what is acceptable
behavior are continuously and fluidly redefined and enforced.49 These
forms of governance take on more or less formality depending on the
environment. For example, inter- and intra-guild relations set relatively
rigid governance structures in many Massively Multiplayer Online Role-
Playing Games (MMORPGs).50 In EVE Online, player-led councils
make strategic design decisions.51 In some environments, lawmaking
structures create a hybrid governance regime between the developers
and the participants.52 On the other end of an imaginary scale of
formality, understandings of social conventions are created and
reinforced through continuous conversations between participants in any
community. For example, conceptions of netiquette–internet etiquette–in
discussion fora and mailing lists,53 or the complex understandings of
what is appropriate behavior and what is considered grieving in virtual
worlds, are all generated not solely by the dissemination of rules from
the provider but also from participation in the community itself.54
The agency of the provider can be expressed within ongoing communal
governance to a greater or lesser degree. Malte Ziewitz points out that
eBay, for example, makes use of community norms and practices to
encourage effective ordering over a loose-knit network while minimizing
the costs of direct regulation.55 In this way, eBay is able to influence
“community values” as to what it means to be a positive participant in
49. Nikolas Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism, 22
ECON. & SOC’Y 283, 286 (1993) (“The forms of power that subject us, the systems of rule
that administer us, the types of authority that master us – do not find their principle of
coherence in a State nor do they answer to a logic of oppression or domination or the other
constitutive oppositions of liberal political philosophy – least of all, its ways of dividing the
political from the non-political. The force field with which we are confronted in our present
is made up of a multiplicity of interlocking apparatuses for the programming of this or that
dimension of life, apparatuses that cannot be understood according to a polarization of
public and private or state and civil society.”).
50. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 44-46.
51. See Pétur Jóhannes Óskarsson, The Council of Stellar Management, Implementation
of Deliverative, Democratically Elected Council in EVE, EVE ONLINE, http://www.eveonline
.com/download/devblog/CSM.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
52. See Law, A TALE IN THE DESERT, http://www.atitd.org/wiki/tale4/Law (last updated
Apr. 7, 2011).
53. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45
EMORY L.J. 911, 920 (1996).
54. See Humphreys, supra note 38; Greg Lastowka, The Planes of Power: EverQuest as
Text, Game and Community, 9 GAME STUD., issue 1 (2009), http://gamestudies.org/0901/
articles/lastowka.
55. See Ziewitz, supra note 46.
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the eBay community, and thereby subtly shape the way in which
participants experience and behave on the auction site. This subtle form
of governance reflects Foucault’s understanding of governmentality56–as
Rose describes it, “[t]o govern without governing society, that is to say,
to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous
agents–citizens, consumers, parents, employees, managers, investors.”57
This non-obvious form of governance regulates by influencing and
shaping behavior and is generally effective precisely because it is non-
obvious.
B. Limits on Internal Punishment
The first issue to analyze is what sort of limits may be applied to
punishments imposed wholly within a virtual community. While the
contractual terms generally appropriate a broad discretion to the
provider, the limits imposed by contract law will shape the possibilities
of internal enforcement. It is useful here to return to the well-worn58
example of Bragg v. Linden Research,59 where Linden alleged that
Bragg had broken the Second Life rules by exploiting a loophole that
allowed him to purchase land for significantly under market value and
terminated his account.60 Bragg, on the other hand, argued that he
had done nothing wrong and that, even if he had, the punishment was
excessive, as Linden had confiscated several thousand dollars worth of
his in-world property. Bragg sought judgment on the basis of consumer
protection law, fraud, conversion, intentional interference with contrac-
tual relations, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and tortious breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.61
Rule of law values suggest that the provider ought to be able to
enforce the rules of the community in order to maintain a cohesive
56. Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND
STRUCTURALISM ANDHERMENEUTICS 208, 219-23 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow eds.,
1982) (discussing the nature of power and the power relationship in governance).
57. Rose, supra note 49, at 298.
58. For a more detailed overview of the issues, see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God
Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (2009); Bobby Glushko, Tales of the (Virtual) City:
Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507 (2007); Steven
J. Horowitz, Bragg v. Linden’s Second Life: A Primer in Virtual World Justice, 34 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 223 (2008); Hannah Yee Fen Lim, Virtual World, Virtual Land but Real
Property, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 304 (2010); Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can
Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159 (2010).
59. 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
60. See id. at 596-97.
61. See id. at 597 & n.8.
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community.62 A system of sanctions is not a strict requirement of good
governance, but many communities adopt one in order to deter and
punish breaches of the peace.63 Rule of law theory, however, suggests
limits on punishment–that are not arbitrary,64 that rules of behavior
are clear, understood, and predictable,65 and that rules are imposed in
a way that is equal and fair.66 Apart from procedural safeguards, rule
of law theory also highlights a requirement of proportionality in
punishment.67 Proportionality is used as an analytical method of
evaluating the conflict between the needs of the society in maintaining
order and the citizen’s interests to be free from excessive interference or
punishment.68 Under both utilitarian and retributive conceptions of
punishment, there is an assumption that the punishment ought to be
proportional to the wrong-doing.69 The rule of law requires that the
62. For example, one of Lon L. Fuller’s eight routes to failure for legal systems is a
divergence between the rules as posited and as practically enforced. LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969).
63. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 240 (11th prtg. 1981) (citing THOMAS HOBBES,
THE LEVIATHAN, chs. XIII-XVIII (1988)) (“By enforcing a public system of penalties
government removes the grounds for thinking that others are not complying with the rules.
For this reason alone, a coercive sovereign is presumably always necessary, even though
in a well-ordered society sanctions are not severe and may never need to be imposed.
Rather, the existence of effective penal machinery serves as men’s security to one
another.”); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
74 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
64. DICEY, supra note 29, at 188.
65. See FULLER, supra note 62, at 63-64; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
74-75 (1944); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAW Q. REV. 195, 198-200
(1977); RAWLS, supra note 63.
66. Raz, supra note 65, at 200-02; RAWLS, supra note 63, at 235; ALLAN, supra note 30,
at 121; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 243 (1986).
67. See DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-60 (2004); Dieter Grimm,
Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO
L.J. 383, 385, 396 (2007); Alec Stone Sweet & JudMathews, Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75, 125-27, 129 (2008); see also
FOUCAULT, supra note 63, at 73 (discussing pressure to ensure that penalties are
“regulated and proportioned to the offences”).
68. See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 67, at 73-74.
69. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 12-13 & n. 14 (1955)
(citing BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ch. XIII-XV (rev. ed.
1823)) (“if utilitarian considerations are followed penalties will be proportional to offenses
in this sense: the order of offenses according to seriousness can be paired off with the order
of penalties according to severity. Also the absolute level of penalties will be as low as
possible. This follows from the assumption that people are rational (i.e., that they are able
to take into account the ‘prices’ the state puts on actions), the utilitarian rule that a penal
system should provide a motive for preferring the less serious offense, and the principle
that punishment as such is an evil.”).
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punishment be suited to the crime and that similar cases be treated
alike.70
What, then, can we make of Bragg’s claim? There appears to be two
alternatives–either we accept that governance in Second Life does not
and should not live up to the ideals of the rule of law, or we attempt to
investigate whether Linden’s treatment of Bragg was legitimate in the
circumstances. The first option is the classic liberal option under
freedom of contract: the parties, Bragg and Linden, are private entities,
and the law is not concerned with any question of the rule of law
between them. In this conception, the rule of law is an issue between
the state and its citizens, and while Bragg may have a valid complaint
about his treatment within Second Life, there is no legally recognizable
claim unless he can point to a breach of contract. Since the contract
effectively allocates absolute discretion to Linden, Bragg will have little,
if any, recourse in territorial courts.
I have argued previously that this approach is too simplistic in its
delegitimization of the role of the territorial state in ensuring that the
interests of its citizens are adequately protected.71 There are obviously
circumstances and communities where certain aspects of the rule of law
are not important (particularly in play spaces where game rules are
irrational and arbitrary),72 but the extent to which these values are
important or unimportant is highly dependent upon the scope of consent
in any given environment.
The analysis needed here is accordingly much more complicated and
rests on an analysis of consent within the community. Looking at the
factual circumstances, Linden may be able to mount a strong argument
that exploiting a loophole in the auction system in order to purchase
land that is not listed for sale at a price significantly under market
value is known and understood to be wrongful. The Terms of Service
require that participants agree not to “disobey any requirements,
procedures, policies or regulations of networks” connected to Second
Life,73 and it is likely that participants understand that Linden would
be likely to punish those who exploit vulnerabilities in the auction
system. The prohibition against exploiting in this manner is so
sufficiently clear and well-known that, even if it is not explicitly stated
70. See ALLAN, supra note 30, at 23, 121; RAWLS, supra note 63, at 237.
71. See Suzor, supra note 8.
72. See Lastowka, supra note 31, at 389-90.
73. Linden Lab Official: Terms of Service Archive, SECOND LIFE, cl. 4.1(viii) (Apr. 29,
2010), http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Linden_Lab_Offcial:Terms_of_Service_Archive/Thr
ough_29_April_2010 [hereinafter Linden Lab Terms of Service]. Current terms of service
for Second Life are available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php.
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in relation to the specific exploit,74 it is probably valid and legitimate
in the circumstances. The conclusion that Bragg is likely in breach of
his contractual obligations to Linden, accordingly, seems legitimate. The
situation would change if the rule in question had not been properly
made. For example, if the rule had changed recently without sufficient
notice, we would be much less comfortable with a finding that it had
been validly incorporated into the contract.75 Similarly, if the rule was
technically in place but only rarely enforced, we might expect that
Linden should be estopped or otherwise restrained from enforcing it.76
If the rule is a valid one, is the penalty imposed just? In contractual
terms, should Linden be entitled to repudiate the contract and terminate
Bragg’s account for the breach, and if so, should it be entitled to destroy
Bragg’s virtual property? This question is much more difficult to
answer. Assuming that Bragg’s exploitation was sufficient to warrant
termination, we have not yet been able to articulate an answer about
what should happen to his virtual property. Do participants, by joining
and participating in Second Life, consent to the principle that, if they
break the rules, Linden can punish them by confiscating their assets and
terminating their accounts? The Terms of Service, written by Linden,
assert that they do:
Linden Lab has the right at any time for any reason or no reason to
suspend or terminate your Account, terminate this Agreement, and/or
refuse any and all current or future use of the Service without notice
or liability to you. In the event that Linden Lab suspends or termi-
74. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 815
(1989) (arguing that retrospective prohibitions on behavior that was socially but not legally
proscribed may not offend values of the rule of law).
75. David R. Collins, Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Other Software License Agreements:
Litigating a Digital Pig in a Poke in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 563 (2009);
Peter J. Quinn, A Click Too Far: The Difficulty in Using Adhesive American Law License
Agreements to Govern Global Virtual Worlds, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 757, 779-80 (2010)
(explaining that in the Bragg case “[t]he unilateral modification right in particular made
the agreement severely one-sided and effectively determined that the agreement was
unconscionable”); Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a party could not unilaterally vary terms of a contract merely by changing
the terms on their website), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1242 (2008).
76. Whether an estoppel can be successfully raised will be highly dependent on how
explicit the representation of security in virtual items was and whether the participant
reasonably relied upon it. See David P. Sheldon, Claiming Ownership, But Getting Owned:
Contractual Limitations on Asserting Property Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV.
751, 779-82 (2007) (explaining the potential for a participant to raise an estoppel argument
where the virtual world owner encourages commodification); see also Kurt Hunt, This Land
Is Not Your Land: Second Life, CopyBot, and the Looming Question of Virtual Property
Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 141, 155-56 (2007).
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nates your Account or this Agreement, you understand and agree that
you shall receive no refund or exchange for any unused time on a
subscription, any license or subscription fees, any content or data
associated with your Account, or for anything else.77
These Terms of Service, however, may be at odds with community
norms. Linden Lab promotes Second Life as a place where participants
can “own virtual land,”78 and there is a plausible argument to be made
that participants generally feel a sense of entitlement to their assets and
currency within Second Life–a sense of entitlement that has been
actively encouraged by Linden.79 Some sort of punishment is likely
warranted in order to deter wrongful behavior, but there may be a valid
argument that punishment should be limited to expulsion from the
community–that, if Linden chose to exercise its right to terminate
Bragg’s account, it would then owe him compensation for the value of his
assets that are destroyed as a result, perhaps under an estoppel or a
claim that falls back to property rights in the virtual assets.80
Even if we were to determine that both the rule and punishment are
legitimate, we still need to consider whether the method for imposing the
punishment is legitimate. This too is a highly contextually sensitive
inquiry. The level of due process that is required to legitimately eject a
participant from a virtual community will vary greatly according to the
norms of the community and the level of investment that participants
have in that community.81 In Second Life, the provider, Linden Lab,
has made a significant effort to cast the community as a place where
participants can invest and flourish, which, in turn, tends to engender
a sense of stability and security in access to the community. Partici-
pants are likely to expect a certain level of due process in the determina-
tion of allegations made against them, and it would seem desirable to
examine whether Bragg was given a fair opportunity to respond to the
claims and whether the decision to eject him was made on proper
grounds.
77. Linden Lab Terms of Service, supra note 73, at cl. 2.6.
78. At least until August 22, 2008, Linden Lab proudly proclaimed that residents could
“own virtual land” as part of their marketing material on their website. The page has since
been removed but is available on the Internet Archive. See Own Virtual Land, SECOND
LIFE (Aug. 22, 2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20080822144829/http://secondlife.com
/whatis/land.php.
79. See BENJAMIN DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF
VIRTUAL WORLDS 109-12 (2008).
80. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005); Lim,
supra note 58.
81. See Michael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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All of this should lead us to a tentative normative conclusion about
whether Linden legitimately ejected Bragg and legitimately confiscated
his virtual assets. It does not, however, help us to determine what
Bragg can do to address any perceived wrongs. His options, like those
of most participants dealing with a provider who holds a great deal of
power, are rather limited. He can do nothing and quit Second Life. He
can accept the ban but attempt to create a new character, starting fresh
under a new identity. He can petition Linden Lab to reconsider his
punishment and attempt to garner support from the community in doing
so. If none of these options are desirable or fruitful, he may well turn
to a state that has some power over Linden and ask for its aid in
resolving the injustice he alleges he has suffered. Bragg did, in fact,
bring suit, although the high costs of legal action and the difficulty of
challenging the terms of the contract make this a prohibitively difficult
option for most aggrieved participants.82
We may well prefer to settle disputes at a community level rather
than involve the legal systems of various territorial states, for a variety
of reasons. The smallest, most intimate level is likely to have the best
understanding of the community needs and the dispute.83 Those
outside the community are likely to incur significant costs in under-
standing and enforcing the community needs and norms. There is an
ever-present risk that decisions made from outside the community will
result in bad rules that threaten the further development of the
community.84 For play spaces, the unique nature of gameplay rules, in
tension with the logic of the legal system, means that legal rules are
unlikely to properly recognize the needs of the community.85 Difficul-
ties are likely to arise with conflicting decisions from different jurisdic-
tions.86 External enforcement is alienating in the sense that it requires
participants and providers to step outside of familiar and tailored
82. The ability of players to seek redress against providers is somewhat enlarged
through the possibility of bringing a class action suit on behalf of a larger number of
aggrieved participants. One such suit has recently been filed against Linden Lab
concerning rights to virtual property in Second Life. See Complaint, Evans v. Linden
Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2010) (No. 2-:10-cv-01679-ER),
available at http://virtuallanddispute.com.
83. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent:
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998).
84. See Bartle, supra note 30, at 27; Castronova, supra note 30; James Grimmelmann,
Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of Real and Virtual Worlds, 11 FIRST MONDAY, NO.
2 (2006), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1312/1232;
Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27.
85. Lastowka, supra note 31, at 393.
86. See David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155 (1996).
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internal governance mechanisms and frame their dispute in a way that
is recognizable by the territorial legal system. Importantly, the prospect
of external intervention may cause instability within the community, as
it calls into question the authority of the provider and the strength and
legitimacy of community rules and enforcement mechanisms; the threat,
as David Post points out, is that if community decisions are subject to
continual external oversight, real legitimate internal governance may
not emerge.87
For all of these reasons, we may prefer for the community to resolve
disputes, rather than have them adjudicated in territorial courts.
Nevertheless, at some point, perceived injustice is likely to warrant legal
intervention.88 If territorial courts are able to provide a legal remedy
for these limited cases, they may be able to condition internal gover-
nance in general to be somewhat more legitimate. Very few cases will
ever reach final judgment in court; the mere existence of a potential
remedy, however, is likely to encourage settlements and discourage the
most egregious illegitimate governance practices. Over time, the setting
of limits in territorial courts is then likely to loosely constrain autono-
mous community governance to acceptable standards.89 Rule of law
theory suggests that, within these loose acceptable standards, courts
generally should not interfere with the discretion of providers; the lesson
to be learned from administrative law is that discretion is necessary to
allow fair application of the rules but that the exercise of discretion must
be constrained to ensure that it is legitimate.90 By developing these
constraints around abuses of power, courts would likely be able to
encourage the development of internal dispute resolution and safeguard
the autonomy of the community.91
The Bragg case may well be an example of such a limiting case. The
core issue was whether termination of the contract was appropriate in
the circumstances, and whether, as a result, Linden was entitled to
87. See David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTACLARACOMPUTER&HIGH
TECH. L.J. 883 (2008).
88. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2044-45 (2004) (“[P]eople have simply invested too much time,
energy, and money in virtual worlds to imagine that the law will leave these worlds alone,
and allow them to develop their own norms and resolve their own disputes unhindered.”).
89. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of
Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 465 (2008).
90. ALLAN, supra note 30.
91. Cf. Post, supra note 87, at 913 (arguing that participants in virtual communities
desire to design their own legal institutions and would be more likely to do so without
outside interference); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 84.
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confiscate and destroy the value of Bragg’s virtual assets.92 This issue,
while novel, presents a question that today’s courts are able to deal with.
There is a real and nontrivial monetary loss claim, which alleviates the
first hurdle common to virtual community disputes–that any losses are
virtual losses and not serious enough to consider in a territorial court.93
Importantly, these losses highlight the legitimate legal questions to be
raised regarding contractual interpretation, unfair or unconscionable
contractual terms, estoppel, good faith, and the intersection of contract
and property rights.94 Each of these questions provides an opportunity
to examine the legitimacy of the rule, the punishment, and the manner
in which the punishment was imposed.
The settlement of Bragg means that these particular questions of fact
and law remain largely unanswered. In similar cases in the future,95
much will depend upon the expectations of participants. The applicabili-
ty and rigor of standards of legitimacy in setting and enforcing rules is
highly dependent on the contextual norms of the community and the
consent of participants within the community. Where the community is
built upon, and is understood to be built upon, the arbitrary creation and
enforcement of rules, an offended participant is not likely to have a very
strong argument based in legitimacy. On the other hand, where
participants are encouraged and accustomed to expect some level of
stability in their virtual identity and assets, it will be open for a
territorial court to require a higher standard of legitimacy in the
exercise of contractual rights. The greatest challenges in this process
come from the difficulty in identifying harm to the participant and the
difficulty in evaluating consent within the community.
92. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
93. Dan E. Lawrence, It Really is Just a Game: The Impracticability of Common Law
Property Rights in Virtual Property, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 530 (2008) (arguing that the
Bragg case “recognized that virtual property has value,” and that this recognition “creates
much-needed protection. If virtual property has value in the eyes of the law, then virtual
property holders can prove damages, an essential element of almost any claim.”).
94. Fairfield, supra note 89, at 455-56 (arguing that vertical relationships can be
resolved by contract); Lawrence, supra note 93, at 529 (arguing that “Bragg demonstrates
that contract law, even in the absence of independent property rights in virtual property,
can provide a remedy for an end-user wrongfully deprived of virtual property”).
95. See, e.g., Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (class
action suit alleging that, by changing the Second Life Terms of Service after the Bragg
case, Linden effectively purported to unilaterally destroy existing interests in participants’
virtual property).
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C. Identifying Harm and the Role of Consent
It is relatively easy to identify the harm in Bragg’s case: he can easily
point to the loss of several thousand dollars worth of virtual property
that Linden confiscated when it suspended his account.96 This mone-
tary loss may, however, obscure more than it reveals underlying tensions
about due process and the imposition of penalties in virtual communi-
ties. For example, a participant in World of Warcraft (WoW), who has
been playing for a number of years and accumulated not only significant
virtual assets but substantial social connections, may suffer very serious
harm upon the termination of her account–even ignoring the monetary
value of the items in any grey market.97 There is a significant open
question as to how to evaluate this loss, and significant pressure from
providers to characterize the loss as a mere loss of consumptive
entertainment.98 If we return to the example of Mr. Bungle, could he
ever complain that he was unjustly banned by a rogue administrator,
acting in direct conflict with the explicit requirement that there be
community consensus in proscribing behavior and imposing punish-
ments?
At the 2009 State of Play conference in New York, Andrew Zaffron
dismissed any issue of harm to the participant in such circumstances:
You’ve got to know going into it, that you’re playing a game. That’s
what you’re paying for–to play a game and even though you play for
two years, that’s fifteen bucks a month, you play for two thousand
hours over that three year period–or three thousand hours–you got a
heck of a deal. Even if at the end of the day, you can’t take your
character and sell it to somebody else for a thousand dollars, you still
got a great deal. Where else can you get entertainment that cheap?99
Zaffron’s argument, while somewhat objectionably casting the communi-
ty relationship as mere passive consumption in order to delegitimize any
claim of harm by participants, contains an important insight. A large
part of the relationship between a provider and its participants will be
determined by what the participants come to expect–what they know
96. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 609 n. 19.
97. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 135; Sal Humphreys, Commodifying Culture-It’s not
just About the Virtual Sword, in OTHER PLAYERS (Jonas Heide Smith & Miguel Sicart eds.,
2004).
98. See Grimmelmann, supra note 84 (explaining that providers are very hesitant to
allow states to interfere in the exercise of their discretionary powers).
99. Andrew Zaffron et al., Panel at the State of Play VI Conference: Current Legal
Issues for Virtual Worlds at New York Law School (June 19, 2009), 44m, video available
at http://nyls.mediasite.com/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=d74f5d6301c2445dbb96d5ad13f611b0.
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before joining the community and what they learn through participation.
Zaffron draws a distinction between communities that he asserts are
successful in structuring participant expectations and those, like Second
Life, that take on risks and obligations because of the way in which they
create expectations.100
Zaffron may well be correct that, in a particular game environment,
a participant will have no reason to expect that she would be entitled to
any proprietorial rights in her avatar or virtual assets. The important
recognition, however, is that this will be contextually dependent upon
the norms of the community and the expectations of participants and
cannot be answered by a simple literal examination of the applicable
contractual documents. If disputes are to be satisfactorily resolved, we
should be more attuned to the expectations of participants, both before
they join and as they become more deeply immersed in the community.
In Mr. Bungle’s case, then, we would need a lot more information. It
may be that, in spite of the explicit decree that community governance
in LambdaMOO would be wholly consensual, LambdaMOO participants
still understood that, fundamentally, those in charge could still exercise
their powers to punish outside of the consensual process. Perhaps
participants did not come to expect much more than arbitrary treatment
at the hands of the administrators; in either case, Mr. Bungle’s
punishment could not be said to be illegitimate from the perspective of
internal community norms. Less anachronistically, even if Mr. Bungle’s
toading was illegitimate, maybe exclusion from LambdaMOO mattered
little more than exclusion from any community discussion board or IRC
chat channel; while disappointing and perhaps somewhat hurtful, this
is not necessarily a wrong we would want to address within the legal
system.
On the other hand, we may well come to a different conclusion in
modern virtual worlds. In the massively multiplayer game spaces that
Zaffron is concerned with, we must be careful not to be overly dismissive
of the harm that participants may suffer when they are ejected from a
community and cut off from their social relations.101 World of Warcraft
may be the most prominent example; with twelve million players, many
of whom have been playing for two or three years or more, the idea that
losing access to the community would be unimportant because it is
100. Id. at 45m.
101. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 135 (“The common framing of games as ‘simply
entertainment’ often obscures the ways they act as key cultural sites in which forgoing
participation may have real costs. . . . As people find their friends, family, colleagues, and
the broader culture engaging in some sphere, the desire to participate can be quite strong
and even can form a social imperative.”).
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merely consumptive entertainment can seem quite disingenuous.
Clearly, players in WoW invest a good deal of time and energy in their
virtual character and feel a sense of entitlement to both the avatar and
its assets. Just as clearly, the social bonds formed within the environ-
ment are real, important bonds that can have a deep personal value to
the participants. Banning a participant and severing these bonds has
a real punitive effect; ignoring this punitive effect in favor of a consump-
tion model is likely to lead to serious error in our evaluation of the
impact of the exercise of private governance power. If WoW players in
fact have a shared understanding that they will not be banned
arbitrarily or unfairly, and I think they do, then we should be concerned
if and when such punishments are illegitimately imposed.
Essentially, the suitability of contractual doctrine to address these
tensions will turn on the willingness of the courts to consider the social
norms within the community in the face of clear contractual language.
If such an inquiry is possible, contract law may yet prove to be a
suitable vehicle for understanding disputes about legitimate governance
and shaping the acceptable contours of the exercise of private power. An
analysis of the community norms would provide the vital information
that a court would require in order to determine whether a particular
exercise of power was legitimate. In some communities, cheating may
be so abhorrent and routinely punished that the community as a whole
expects that those found to have broken the rules will be summarily
ejected without compensation. In other communities, the provider’s
encouragement of the secondarymarket and exhortations to invest in the
community may mean that some semblance of due process and
proportionality is required in enforcing the rules. If community norms
can be examined, courts will be able to determine some reasonably
accurate approximation of consent and legitimacy in governance. If the
determination of contractual principle can be made to depend upon that
elusive degree of legitimacy, then we can be reasonably assured that
courts will be able to adequately address the governance tensions that
permeate these disputes.
It is important to stress that this process of examining the legitimacy
of governance does not necessarily mean that providers should be
stripped of the power to create and manage a desirable community.102
Community norms would normally have to reflect the need for the
102. This is the fear expressed by Bartle and Castronova, that virtual world providers
will have their hands tied by law to the collective detriment of all. See Bartle, supra note
30; Castronova, supra note 30; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 84.
C:\MYFILES\DATA\63202.1 Thu, 07-Jun-12 12:33 pm
546 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
provider to maintain order within the community.103 In some commu-
nities, the importance of social cohesion may largely outweigh any
individual interests that participants may have in not being treated
unfairly. So, for example, members of a community support group forum
could legitimately expect the relatively harsh treatment of those
participants who broke rules of privacy or respect in order to protect the
integrity and common purpose of the community. For example, a less
cohesive and more heterogenous community, like Second Life, may
expect more in the way of due process, particularly where participants
are encouraged to become heavily invested in the community. This
determination will always be a question of fact and will likely involve a
difficult, critical examination of the community norms in question. It is
a task, however, that territorial courts are well-suited to addressing, at
least in cases where the harm suffered is great enough to justify the
expense required to bring the issue to trial.
We can contrast the example from Bragg with the threatened
suspension of Sara Andrews from WoW for advertising an in-game guild
that was friendly to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered partici-
pants.104 Blizzard alleged that Andrews’s communications breached
the code of conduct, which prohibits “any content or language which, in
the sole and absolute discretion of Blizzard, is deemed to be offensive,
. . . sexually explicit, . . . or otherwise objectionable.”105 In this
example, Blizzard eventually backed down on its policy and apologized
to Andrews after significant public outcry.106 Nevertheless, if Blizzard
had not overturned its initial decision, we may have come to the
conclusion that its exercise of discretion in determining that Andrews’s
communications were prohibited offensive speech was illegitimate.
Blizzard’s finding seems to directly conflict with the social norms of the
WoW community, which is, like many online games, notoriously
homophobic in parts.107 In an open letter to Blizzard, a group of
103. ALLAN, supra note 30, at 90 (“The good citizen will acknowledge the necessity for
legal authority, as a means of facilitating the reasonable coordination of the myriad plans
and purposes of individuals, according to some generally acceptable, if imperfect, scheme
of justice; and he [sic] will therefore acknowledge as binding many rules whose justice he
doubts or even denies, in deference to the overriding needs of the common good of his
community (as opposed to the utopian community he would ideally prefer).”).
104. Mark Ward, Gay Rights Win in Warcraft World, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2006, 8:42
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4700754.stm.
105. Blizzard, Terms of Use, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, cl. 9(B)(i) (July 29, 2008),
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html.
106. Ward, supra note 104.
107. See Gordon Calleja et al., Open Letter to Blizzard Entertainment, TERRA NOVA
(Feb. 8, 2006), http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2006/02/open_letter_to_.html (arguing
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authors from the TerraNova and Many-to-Many blogs articulated the
core conflict in values at play: “Blizzard does not [punish] the routine
use of homophobic and misogynistic insults, nor does it [punish] all
manner of vulgar and abusive trash talk. They should not [punish] the
mention of the existence of a GLBT-friendly guild.”108
The overwhelmingly and somewhat aggressively straight male nature
of the WoW social environment is a large source of tension for queer
gamers, and openly queer-friendly guilds can provide much needed
support and respite from the rest of the community.109 There are
really two arguments about legitimacy here. The first is a substantive
rights issue, that queer players need some protection from a hostile
majority; the second is an inconsistency in application, where hostile
homophobic speech is not deemed to be offensive, but the mere public
mention of a queer-friendly guild is.
Dealing first with the inconsistency issue, it seems to be one of consent
at its core. Joshua Fairfield, in particular, has emphasized the role of
consent in determining the relationship between participants in virtual
communities.110 While Fairfield uses consent as a means to determine
the horizontal relationships between participants who are not in
contractual relationships, this approach also seems to provide an
attractive normative basis for evaluating and enforcing the rules of
virtual communities in the vertical relationships between participants
and providers.111 Fairfield argues that contractual agreements have
a dual mode, in that they create binding obligations between partici-
that “the general chat channel of WoW is an extremely open communication environment
that is routinely threatening, abusive, and vulgar, not to mention misogynistic and
homophobic”); Jenny Sundén, Play as Transgression: An Ethnographic Approach to Queer
Game Cultures, in BREAKING NEW GROUND: INNOVATION IN GAMES, PLAY, PRACTICE AND
THEORY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009DIGITALGAMESRESEARCHASS’NCONFERENCE 3 (2009),
http://digra.org/d1/d6/09287.40551.pdf (arguing that for queer players “to ‘come out’ in the
game, or simply express an inclusive attitude in terms of sexual orientations, has proved
to be enough for exclusion”).
108. Calleja et al., supra note 107 (the original letter uses the word “sanction” which
I have replaced with “punish,” which appears to be more correct when considering the
context and intention of the letter as a whole).
109. Sundén, supra note 107, at 4 (describing the experience of joining a queer-friendly
guild as “coming home . . . . The feeling of entering the guild was one of relief and
happiness. It was a feeling of relief related to no longer having to worry about covering
up bits of your life that would not fit in, or would even be regarded as ‘inappropriate’ in
the game environment. It was a sense of happiness in experiencing the warmest of
welcomes imaginable.”); see also Humphreys, supra note 45, at 155-56.
110. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 823 (2009).
111. But see id. at 834 (arguing that the vertical and horizontal components of the
contractual relationships need to be separated, and that consensus only really has
application horizontally).
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pants and providers, but that they merely inform social norms between
participants.112 For Fairfield, while the contract may be enforceable
as written between participants and proprietors, a court must look to the
entirety of the community norms in order to determine the relationships
between participants themselves because no general contract exists
between participants.113 Fairfield raises a good point here but does not
go far enough. The ability to create communities with diverse consensu-
al norms is one of the fundamental values that underpins contractual
governance in cyberlaw theory, that consent essentially provides the core
justification for the ongoing support of the state for contractual terms of
service in private community governance.114 Where the contractual
rules in fact diverge from broad conceptions of consensual community
norms, we should be concerned about the legitimacy of private gover-
nance. There is accordingly a strong argument that community norms
should be evaluated in enforcing the contract vertically between
participants and providers; in cases of direct conflict, if legitimacy is to
be encouraged, the contract should not always be enforceable in its strict
literal sense.
The sensitivity of a contractual governance framework to these
questions of legitimacy is not yet clear, but there does appear to be
sufficient theoretical flexibility in contractual doctrine to allow courts to
come to conclusions that support both autonomy and legitimacy. At
least in theory, where there is some uncertainty, the social norms of the
community can be relied upon to inform the interpretation of the
contract, just as business practices and past performance can sometimes
inform the interpretation of contracts.115 In the case of explicit
conflict, there is significant scope for the doctrines of unconscionabili-
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Suzor, supra note 8, at 1881.
115. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2006) (providing that “the express terms of an agreement
and any applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be
construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other”); Eric A. Posner, The Parol
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998) (examining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the
interpretation of contracts); see also Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms
and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB.
L. REV. 506 (2006) (arguing for a more dynamic, contextual contractual interpretation
where necessary to determine the intent of the parties or to promote a policy or legislative
objective).
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ty,116 waiver,117 good faith,118 and estoppel119 to be used to avoid
a result that invalidates community norms in favor of a strict literal
interpretation. It remains to be seen whether courts will be willing to
exercise this flexibility in a way that addresses the tensions that
permeate private governance in virtual communities.
It is important to note that communities are rarely, if ever, homoge-
nous. It will often be difficult to identify a particular social norm in any
given community. The governance process is an ongoing struggle
between all participants and the provider. There is often conflict
between different opinions on social norms held by different portions of
the community, and these lines are continually being redrawn. Even the
provider will often show multiple conflicting views on community
rules–particularly visible in the tension between different divisions, such
as those between the legal team, the development team, the customer
service team, and the producers,120 but also between different individu-
al representatives on each of those teams. The result is that it will be
difficult to identify a particular conception of a norm that holds
universally for a particular community at a particular point in time.
Courts seeking to discover such a norm will only be able to make rough
approximations of an overall community standard, rather than a wholly
determinative finding. The judicial system is well-suited, however, to
deal with complex questions of fact and should be reasonably well-suited
116. See, e.g., Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (holding that Linden Lab’s binding
arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
117. Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the
Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 299-300 (2007) (arguing that waiver at common law may be
applicable to virtual world contracts where developers do not consistently or uniformly
enforce contractual terms).
118. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2006) (obligation of good faith); see also Michael Meehan,
Virtual Property: Protecting Bits in Context, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH., No. 2, art. 7, at 33-37
(2006). (discussing the potential applicability of good faith to restrain providers from
devaluing virtual property).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see, e.g., Horowitz, supra
note 58, at 236 (arguing that Bragg could potentially rely on an argument in estoppel to
prevent Linden Lab from reneging on its assertion that Second Life residents own their
virtual land); Hunt, supra note 76, at 155-56 (arguing that inducing participants to treat
in-world currency as real money may lead to an enforceable modification to the EULA by
promissory estoppel in communities like Project Entropia and Second Life); Sheldon, supra
note 76, at 779-82 (discussing the possibility of a successful promissory estoppel claim in
virtual worlds).
120. See, e.g., John Banks, Co-Creative Expertise: Auran Games and Fury – A Case
Study, 130MEDIA INT’LAUSTL. 77, 80 (2009) (explaining tensions between customer service
and development teams contributing to the failure of Fury, a $15million three-year project,
in 2007).
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to find a workable approximation of community norms–as long as courts
are careful not to oversimplify and essentialize one particular person or
group’s view of the community norms. It is, accordingly, likely to be
reasonable to require the person who seeks to assert that a literal
contractual interpretation of the rules is inconsistent with the commun-
ity’s understanding to bear the burden of proving that assertion.
Applying a consent-based framework to the examples above, we can
see that it appears to produce an appealing distinction. If we seriously
evaluate consent within the community, Second Life’s Terms of Service
seem to reflect a norm that clearly prohibits Bragg from exploiting the
auction system. As a first step, if Bragg has broken the rules, he can
legitimately be punished, although the exact nature of that punishment
and the way in which it is imposed has not yet been resolved. WoW’s
terms, on the other hand, do not reflect a general norm prohibiting Sara
Andrews’s advertising of a queer-friendly guild. Discussion of sexuality
is so common in WoW that it seems wrong for Blizzard to determine that
Andrews had made “offensive . . . sexually explicit” communications.121
Indeed, in comparison to the homophobic language that permeates WoW
culture, Andrews’s advertisement: “OZ is recruiting all levels, but
especially 50-60s! [. . .] We are not ‘glbt only,’ but we are ‘glbt friend-
ly!’”122 does not seem to fall anywhere within acceptable understand-
ings of offensive or objectionable conduct. The limits on discretionary
power sourced from rule of law values, particularly of equality and
predictability, immediately suggest that Blizzard’s determination is
outside the realm of justifiable discretion. It follows that, from the
perspective of evaluating community consent, the contract ought to be
enforceable against Bragg, but not Andrews. If a participant like
Andrews ever came before a territorial court, in enforcing the contractual
agreement, we could then say that the court should restrain the provider
from enforcing the rules to terminate Andrews’s access to the communi-
ty. That action would be incompatible with community understandings
of the construction of the prohibition and the scope of the provider’s
discretion.
As an aside, if WoW were more overtly repressive of queer groups, a
factual evaluation may lead to a conclusion that there is a clear social
norm that queer players should not identify as such and should not
advertise queer-friendly guilds. If this were the case, a wholly consen-
121. Blizzard, supra note 105.
122. See World of Warcraft not Gaymer Friendly, GAMERS EXPERIMENTATIONS (Jan. 16,
2006, 6:12 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20070807071722/http://gamers.experimentatio
ns.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6852 (accessed by entering Gamers Experimentations
URL in the Internet Archive index).
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sus-based model would require that territorial states help to enforce the
rules against a participant like Andrews who clearly contravenes the
community norms. This result seems repugnant, which suggests that a
wholly consensus-based model is inappropriate. It is at this point that
substantive external values are important; there are some rules that
territorial states do not allow communities to consent to, or, if consent
is possible, then the standard required is raised or the potential scope
of consent limited.123 In these cases, as Fairfield puts it, “a more
important real-world norm may well trump the in-world community
norm.”124 It follows that where we do not recognize consent, territorial
courts will be justified in refusing to uphold what would otherwise
appear to be consensual community norms. Accordingly, in Andrews’s
case, if we did not come to a conclusion that Blizzard’s exercise of
discretion was formally inconsistent with community norms, wemay still
come to the conclusion that internal rules that discriminate against
queer players in that way are illegitimate.125 If existing anti-discrimi-
nation law does not prohibit such conduct, we should then conclude that
legislation should be introduced to bar this form of discrimination in
these types of contractual agreements.
This analysis still leaves us somewhat uncertain about what the
appropriate result would have been if the Bragg case had proceeded to
trial. Assuming that Linden’s allegations were correct, Bragg almost
certainly broke accepted community norms by purchasing land that was
not listed for sale, at a price significantly under market value. The
bigger question, however, is whether such a breach is legitimately
punishable by termination of Bragg’s account and seizure of his virtual
assets. There are valid arguments in favor of both parties and there is
no easy answer. An internal perspective suggests that some measure of
punishment may be appropriate in order to provide a disincentive for
participants to break the rules. If Linden, instead of terminating
Bragg’s account, had merely confiscated the disputed land, there would
be little reason for future participants to refrain from exploiting future
bugs. In order to encourage social cohesion, then, some punishment may
123. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
(discussing inalienable and partially-inalienable entitlements).
124. Fairfield, supra note 110, at 837.
125. Under current law, discrimination on the basis of sexuality is not consistently
prohibited. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (2010); Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality and
Civil Rights: Re-Imagining Anti-Discrimination Laws, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 565
(2000).
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be legitimate, and the confiscation of Bragg’s assets and termination of
his account may be an appropriate (if severe) punishment.
On the other hand, given that Linden clearly encourages Second Life
participants to invest in the community and own virtual land, there is
a strong suggestion that such an extreme punishment ought not be
meted out lightly. Second Life residents clearly feel very attached to
their in-world assets and appear to have come to expect some degree of
certainty in their possession, notwithstanding the Terms of Service.126
Rule of law theory helps to conceptualize the tension here. While the
interests of social cohesion may permit the imposition of punishments on
those who break the rules, there is an equally strong requirement that
punishments ought to be imposed justly. Harsh penalties may be
permissible, but they must be proportionate to the wrong,127 clear and
unambiguous,128 and imposed in a fair and accountable manner.129
Whether Linden legitimately exercised its discretion will depend on the
extent to which the hypothetical reasonable community member would
understand that her property was subject to removal for a similar breach
of the rules and the extent to which it acted properly–following proper
procedures and imposing the penalty for proper purposes. These are the
questions that should inform the flexibility in contractual doctrine about
whether terms are validly incorporated and whether the exercise of the
provider’s discretion should be restrained by limiting doctrines such as
waiver, estoppel, or good faith.
Ultimately, these are difficult questions of fact, but, again, ones which
territorial courts are relatively well-suited to deal with. What is
important in this analysis is what, precisely, Second Life participants
can be assumed to have consented to by joining and remaining in the
community. It is likely that a thorough examination of community
norms and practice would reveal that Linden has tacitly and explicitly
encouraged participants to feel a sense of entitlement and ownership to
their virtual assets. If this is the case, then it is also likely that the
126. See DURANSKE, supra note 79, at 113 (“If a company wishes to profit by selling
currency and land, and outright encourages users to make their real-life living in the
virtual space, it cannot reasonably protest that the fine print says it is ‘only a game’ when
faced with users who expect to extract that stored value or expect policies that genuinely
protect the assets they have purchased.”).
127. ALLAN, supra note 30, at 121 (arguing that “[c]onformity to [precepts of due
process and equal justice] ensures a genuine–substantive–equality of all before a law that
serves a coherent (if capacious and adaptable) conception of the common good”).
128. FULLER, supra note 62, at 63-65.
129. DICEY, supra note 29, at 188; FULLER, supra note 62, at 63-64; HAYEK, supra note
65, at 74-75; Raz, supra note 65, at 198-202; RAWLS, supra note 63, at 238; DWORKIN, supra
note 66, at 243.
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community norms of Second Life, the social contract, require Linden to
refrain from unilaterally terminating Bragg’s access and confiscating his
assets without compensation. Accordingly, Linden may have to set in
place more just procedures for the termination of accounts, or perhaps
introduce more appropriate punishments for those who break the
rules.130 If this factual determination holds, we should expect a court
to determine either that Linden was estopped from exercising its rights
in a manner inconsistent with the community norms it encouraged to
develop, that it had varied the contractual arrangement by its conduct,
or that it could not, in good faith, exercise its contractual powers in the
way in which it did.
Linden’s alternative, of course, is to work to change the community
norms that instill participants with a sense of entitlement to the assets
that they buy and create within Second Life; if participants clearly
understand that Linden may arbitrarily remove any of their property at
any time, then people like Bragg would have little claim against Linden.
This approach would undoubtedly reduce investment in Second Life.
One can imagine that both individual participants like Bragg and
corporate participants like IBM131 would hesitate to purchase and
develop land within Second Life if they had no reassurance in the
stability of those assets. Nevertheless, this seems appropriate–if Linden,
as provider of Second Life, wishes to encourage investment, it ought to
provide real security; it should not be entitled to create a false sense of
security in order to encourage investment and simultaneously avoid
accruing any real responsibility.132
Evaluating legitimacy and consent provides a generalizable normative
principle to guide the interpretation and resolution of contractual
disputes in virtual communities. It is the possibility of establishing new
consensual norms that underpins much of the potential that virtual
communities promise, and consent forms the most important measure of
legitimacy in governance in these spaces. When determining whether
a particular norm should be enforceable, courts should undertake a
130. For example, Yee Fen Lim suggests that perhaps Bragg should be given an
opportunity to divest himself of his legitimately acquired virtual property even if his
account were terminated. See Lim, supra note 58, at 325.
131. See, e.g.,Martin LaMonica, IBM Breaks Ground in Second Life, CNETNEWSBLOG
(Oct. 19, 2006, 8:11 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-6127448-7.htm (discussing
IBM’s virtual presence in Second Life).
132. DURANSKE, supra note 79, at 113 (arguing that “[i]f a company wishes to profit by
selling currency and land, and outright encourages users to make their real-life living in
the virtual space, it cannot reasonably protest that the fine print says it is ‘only a game’
when faced with users who expect to extract that stored value or expect policies that
genuinely protect the assets they have purchased”).
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critical examination of actual community consent in order to avoid
enforcing illegitimate rules. Whether a contractual framework will be
suited to addressing governance concerns in virtual communities in the
long-term will depend largely on the extent that courts are able to use
the flexibility in contractual doctrine to draw such a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate community rules.
Evaluating legitimacy in this manner works alongside the substantive
limits that societies impose on the autonomy of individuals to enter into
private arrangements that limit fundamental rights of equality, access
to justice, speech, privacy, or property.133 Various jurisdictions will
determine the appropriate levels of consent and other restraints that are
required before their citizens can waive or alienate these (and other)
substantive interests. Consent, therefore, becomes crucial to both formal
and substantive conceptions of legitimacy. A consent-based model allows
the contract to be interpreted in light of community standards and
should be able to encourage legitimacy without unjustifiably sacrificing
autonomy. This means, largely, that for communities that develop to
expect due process and proportionality in the enforcement of community
rules, participants should potentially be able to sue in territorial courts
when providers fail to uphold those standards, but it also means that
communities that have no use for such standards should not be hindered
by their imposition. It may turn out that very few communities, if any,
develop such reliance. Nevertheless, for those that do, territorial states
ought to ensure that consensual standards are respected in the face of
conflicting formal contractual language.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNAL RULES IN TERRITORIAL COURTS
Beyond the imposition of penalties within a community, a serious
question remains about how providers can enforce the rules against
participants in territorial legal systems. When a rule-breaking
participant flees or is not sufficiently invested in the community,
internal sanctions present little deterrent or punitive effect. If
participants are to be punished for breaking internal rules in these
circumstances, providers will need the assistance of the territorial state.
Whether the territorial state should lend its support to internal rules is
a question that has been considered predominantly from the point of
view of criminal law, and various commentators have espoused relatively
bright-line answers to the proper role of criminal law in virtual worlds.
There is something of a consensus that criminal sanctions are not
appropriate for punishing breaches of the community rules, but that
133. See Suzor, supra note 8.
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those who commit traditional territorial crimes ought not, and do not,
escape responsibility merely by making use of a virtual community.134
In coming to this conclusion, theorists have created a dichotomy between
real crimes and virtual crimes that may be appropriate for the blunt
instrument of territorial criminal law,135 but this method does not
wholly address the underlying issue of punishment for wrongdoings in
virtual communities.
This dichotomy is predominantly expressed as the difference between
wrongs that are only felt within a virtual community and wrongs that
“leak” or “extend” outside the community.136 Much of this dichotomy
can be explained by the need to separate crimes from virtual representa-
tions of crimes; Greg Lastowka and Dan Hunter evoked Rene Magritte’s
famous statement, “ceci n’est pas une pipe,”137 to illustrate that the
representations of crime in virtual worlds are not crimes when they fall
within the consensual realm of internal norms.138 Among theorists
who care about the development of virtual spaces, there is a strong
desire to differentiate the virtualness of these spaces–particularly game
spaces–in order to avoid the gaze of the law, which can threaten to
destroy the consensual fiction.139
Though it is somewhat problematic, there is an important distinction
to be made here. It will certainly be important to avoid criminalizing
behavior that is a mere fictional depiction of illegal behavior, avataracide
being the most prominent example. The nonconsensual killing of
134. Kerr, supra note 27, at 418; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 303-07; Susan
W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1, 51-53 (2008).
135. Kerr, supra note 27, at 425.
136. See Brenner, supra note 134, at 60 (arguing that only where the harm leaks out
“to cause substantial harm in the victim’s ‘real life’ ” could territorial criminal charges be
appropriate); Kerr, supra 27, at 417 (“It is only when harms extend outside the game that
the criminal law should be potentially available to remedy wrongs not redressable
elsewhere.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 315 (arguing that future criminal
prosecutions will depend on being able to point to “real economic harms”).
137. RENÉ MAGRITTE, THE TREACHERY OF IMAGES (1929).
138. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 302, 307.
139. See Bartle, supra note 30, at 27 (arguing that “[v]irtual world administrators have
absolute control over their world vested in the mechanics of that world. As long as this
design principle is respected, administrators can protect the game conceit. If they were
denied absolute control, then the game conceit must be protected some other way;
otherwise, the virtual world would be just another extension of the real world.”);
Castronova, supra note 30, at 196 (“As meaning seeps into these play spaces, their status
as play spaces will erode. As their status as play spaces erodes, the laws, expectations,
and norms of contemporary Earth society will increasingly dominate the atmosphere.
When Earth’s culture dominates, the game will be over, the fantasy will be punctured and
the illusion will be ended for good.”).
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another participant’s avatar is simply not murder,140 and the need to
avoid this type of category mistake has informed much of the scholarship
around virtual crimes.141 Conversely, the use of virtual environments
to commit traditional crimes poses no legal difficulty for territorial states
(although such crimes may be much more difficult to detect and
police).142 Money laundering through Second Life is still money
laundering; fraud through Facebook is still fraud.
This distinction becomes more problematic when we are also required
to consider the interpretative framework of social norms. For example,
when a participant in EVE intentionally deceives another participant
and cheats her out of her hard-earned virtual currency (Isk), there is no
fraud–participants in EVE have consented to the social norm that fraud
is part of the game.143 The tension here is evident when theorists
attempt to map this dichotomy between real and virtual harms. Writing
of the theft of a jacket in Second Life, Susan Brenner suggests that the
answer lies in whether the loss of virtual assets “can be construed as the
infliction of a real world harm”–essentially, whether or not the assets
were paid for with real-world money.144 Brenner characterizes the in-
world theft of assets that have real-world value as real-world cyber-
crimes and argues that the theft should be punishable by territorial
courts if the primary aspect of the harm can be thought of as bleeding
into the victim’s real life.145 Brenner then suggests a dichotomous two-
tiered approach, whereby acts that cause harm that is “limited to the
virtual experiential context” ought to be dealt with within the communi-
ty by the provider, but acts whose effects “leak out of the virtual world
to cause substantial harm in the victim’s ‘real’ life” are appropriately
dealt with by territorial criminal laws.146 Orin Kerr draws a very
similar dichotomy, arguing that “[t]raditional governments can continue
to deal with non-virtual harms arising out of virtual worlds . . . . But
misconduct arising only in a virtual sense should remain the domain of
game administrators.”147
140. JamesGrimmelmann,Virtual Worlds as Comparative Law, 49N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
147, 167 (2004).
141. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 316.
142. Brenner, supra note 134, at 59; Fairfield, supra note 110, at 829-30; Kerr, supra
note 27, at 418-19; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 314-15.
143. Fairfield, supra note 89, at 460-61 (citing Faith Kahn, et al., Panel Presentation
at State of Play, New York Law School: Stock Markets in Virtual Worlds (Oct. 7, 2005))
(Kjartan Pierre Emilsson, lead designer at CCP Games, stating that “fraud is fun”).
144. Brenner, supra note 134, at 56.
145. Id. at 60-61.
146. Id. at 60.
147. Kerr, supra note 27, at 425.
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This distinction seems superficially attractive, but is both normatively
difficult and descriptively unworkable, particularly where a potential
offender would have no way of discerning, at the time of the theft,
whether her actions would be criminal or not. The response to Brenner
must be that the theft of assets within Second Life will be a crime if the
assets have value and the manner of taking is outside the scope of
consent of participants in general.148 This is the point made by Kerr
when he draws the analogy to gambling in card games, where cheat-
ing–moving outside of the scope of consent–renders the acquisition of
money winnings fraudulent.149 Accordingly, thefts and other depic-
tions of wrongs that form part of a game cannot be criminal because
they are consensual, but nonconsensual takings should raise both civil
and criminal liability.
Beyond this, however, the dichotomy begins to break down. When we
rely on such a strong distinction between real and virtual acts, we lose
some nuance in our ability to determine the meanings and wrongfulness
of actions. Kerr, for example, argues that criminal law ought only be
concerned with an external perspective, not the internal meanings of
acts in virtual communities; Mr. Bungle’s acts were “a story (or an
image) of a rape and no more.”150 Kerr’s argument suggests that it
cannot be rape to depict a person’s avatar as engaging in nonconsensual
sexual intercourse because it is not real.151 There is a tension here
between the harm that we apprehend if we, like Dibbell, examine the
meaning of Mr. Bungle’s actions through the interpretative lens of
community norms, and the inability of a wholly external perspective to
recognize harm that happens only virtually. There can be no such hard
distinction between the real and the virtual.152 Fairfield is correct in
criticizing this dichotomy and its resultant effect on legal classification
of acts and harms: “There is no ‘real’ world as distinguished from
‘virtual’ worlds. Rather, all supposedly ‘virtual’ actions originate with
real people, and impact real people, albeit through a computer-mediated
environment. As a result, the distinction between a ‘virtual’ act and a
‘real’ one is not helpful.”153
As an aside, territorial states may, nevertheless, wish to criminalize
some acts carried out within virtual communities that currently do not
148. See Fairfield, supra note 110 (arguing that consent should be used to delimit the
scope of potential legal action in virtual worlds).
149. Kerr, supra note 27, at 420-21.
150. Id. at 418.
151. Id. at 418-19.
152. See Cohen, supra note 14; Fairfield, supra note 110.
153. Fairfield, supra note 110, at 825.
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fit within the definition of their physical analogues. In the case of Mr.
Bungle’s textual rape, we may be quite comfortable in saying that while
the depiction of rape is not criminal rape, it does have a serious negative
impact on the victim and should be criminalized. Perhaps it already does
fit within broader prohibitions on harassment, or perhaps a new crime
ought to be recognized.154 If it turns out that a society also wishes to
criminalize consensual depictions of rape, based upon the intangible
harm to morality or the threat posed by romanticizing rape, then that
too can be accomplished. It may or may not be desirable, but it is
certainly possible for territorial states to criminalize consensual acts
such as age-play or rape-play.155
Assuming that the act is not criminalized, the dichotomy between real
and virtual harm is misleading because it ignores the category of acts
that are neither consensual or harmless, on the one hand, nor clearly
criminal, on the other. The theoretical preoccupation with criminal law
has left a relatively large gap in the category of acts that are considered
to be wrongful and harmful through the interpretative lens of communi-
ty norms but whose impact is not recognized as wrongful by the
territorial state.156 This category is assumed, without much discus-
sion, to be better dealt with within the community than by the
state–largely because of the great hesitancy to impose public criminal
penalties for the breach of private rules.
Kerr argues that criminal law ought not apply to virtual worlds
primarily because providers can better address harms in virtual worlds
than the blunt instrument of criminal law.157 Brenner suggests that
the “appropriate default approach” for dealing with harm within virtual
worlds is that it should be dealt with by the provider, at least where “its
primary effect is likely limited to the virtual experiential context.”158
154. Brenner, supra note 134, at 86.
155. See, e.g., McEwen v Simmons, [2008] 73 NSWLR 10 (Austl.) (an Australian case
holding that a cartoon drawing of Bart and Lisa Simpson engaging in sexual activity
constituted possessing and accessing criminal child pornography under the NSW and
Commonwealth legislation respectively); Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar’s Day in Court: A
Proposal for Obtaining Relief and Resolving Disputes in Virtual World Games, 2007 UCLA
J.L. & TECH., No. 2, art. 6, at 37 (discussing a German criminal investigation into Second
Life residents who were “ ‘reportedly buying sex with other players posing as children, as
well as offering child pornography for sale’ ”); Meek-Prieto, supra note 27 (arguing that age-
play should be criminalized in the United States).
156. Lastowka and Hunter recognize this tension and suggest that there is a category
of “real” virtual crimes, where the provider and the community-at-large may be harmed by
a participant’s actions – such as gold duping. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at
315.
157. Kerr, supra note 27, at 425.
158. Brenner, supra note 134, at 60.
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While Kerr argues strongly against creating new crimes to deal with
virtual wrongs,159 Brenner leaves open the question as to how territori-
al legal systems may react in the future to harms that exist only in the
virtual world but threaten the territorial social order.160 At present,
however, Brenner argues that the primary indication of whether harm
in a virtual world should be dealt with by territorial criminal law is
whether the harm is felt primarily in the physical world or the
virtual–whether the harm leaks into the real world.161
Recognizing this dichotomy leads to a more interesting question in
determining how states should deal with behavior that is not criminal
but is prohibited within virtual communities. For example, assume that
Mr. Bungle’s textual rape does not amount to harassment but clearly
contravenes the acceptable social standards of the community. In
Brenner’s taxonomy, this behavior fits rather uncomfortably between her
definition of a real cybercrime and a fantasy crime. The harm felt by
the victim may or may not leak enough into real life to warrant the
attention of territorial criminal law; if it does not, it is a fantasy crime,
not a real cybercrime.162 This fantasy crime category, however,
Brenner predominantly reserves for consensual depictions of territorial
crimes–age-play, avataracide, or rape.163 Accordingly, Brenner’s focus
is on determining whether the territorial state should prohibit consensu-
al behavior based upon an assumption of systemic harm, rather than
direct harm to the persons involved or the systemic harm to the
community itself.164
This is somewhat symptomatic of the difficulty that we have drawing
boundaries around behavior in virtual communities. Generally, the
punishment of harm within a community is understood as a criminal
issue, but as the theorists above point out, territorial criminal law is a
poor fit for acts whose meaning is determined largely by the context of
the virtual community in which they occur. The focus in the legal
discourse, accordingly, has largely been on whether territorial criminal
law should address acts that are analogous to territorial crimes, rather
than the ways in which community rules are enforced and community
wrongs punished. When we begin to look at the enforcement of
community rules, we enter a difficult territory that exists, once again,
159. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 416-17.
160. Brenner, supra note 134, at 96.
161. Id. at 60-61, 70-71.
162. Id. at 86.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 70-75.
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between the private and the public, and between the virtual and the
physical.
In these borderlands,165 there is a significant theoretical gap in our
conceptions of punishment and deterrence in virtual communities.
Punishment does not form part of a traditional contractual governance
regime, and if criminal law is inapplicable, a tension emerges between
the need of the community to enforce its rules and the private gover-
nance model that delegitimizes punishment. As community governance
is still regarded as a private contractual bargain, the punishment of
community wrongs is considered to be a private issue; and yet, from an
internal perspective, and from the perspective of legal theory, punish-
ment is the domain of public criminal law.
As long as communities can deal with wrongs without explicit state
intervention, this conceptual gap is relatively unimportant. If internal
punishments can be imposed for wrongs that are only understandable
through internal community norms, it should not matter that state law
does not recognize any wrongdoing. If, however, communities are unable
to impose punishment and uphold community rules without the further
assistance of territorial states, then this conceptual gap poses a
significant problem. As enforcement and punishment move from wholly
internal to a community to territorial legal systems, there is a logical
disconnect, and it is not at all clear to what extent territorial states
ought to support providers in their attempts to maintain order within a
community.
A. The Need for Punishment Beyond the Internal Community
Sometimes, internal punishments will not be sufficient to uphold
community rules. Returning to the examples above, of Mr. Bungle’s
textual rape and the exploits of dupers in virtual worlds, it is apparent
that, if community rules are to be enforced against participants who
have either fled or are able to continuously re-enter the community,
providers will need assistance from territorial states. This may be, as
in Mr. Bungle’s case, because the participant does not have significant
in-world capital or is not particularly attached to his or her in-world
identity. In such circumstances, the provider’s response, to terminate the
offender’s account, would have very little effect, either as a punishment
or as a deterrent. A participant who is not invested in his or her avatar
or account can trivially create a new account and start anew every time
he or she is caught breaking the rules. In virtual communities, there is
a continual risk of recidivism with even the most severe punishments.
165. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 251.
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The pseudonymous nature of participation in virtual communities makes
it almost impossible to determine whether a punished offender has
reincarnated into a new avatar in order to escape punishment or
continue her malignant behavior.166 While certain structural and
design choices can limit pseudonymity, doing so is not always desir-
able.167 Because purely internal methods cannot be wholly effective,
at some point, providers are likely to turn to territorial legal systems for
assistance.
Additionally, as in the case of the exploiters and dupers, a wholly
internal enforcement regime provides no prospect for enforcement once
a rule-breaking participant has fled the community. Faced with an
opportunity to break the rules for short-term gain, participants can act
quickly, offloading illicit gains and cashing out windfall profits before
they are caught. In territorial states, an offender’s physical body is
subjected to the criminal law, and escape is both difficult and costly.
Where a participant can profit enough from rule-breaking to make the
loss of social connections and identity worthwhile, leaving a virtual
community is comparatively much easier, even where she is not able or
willing to re-enter under a new identity.
It is important to reiterate that I am not concerned here with the real
cybercrimes–the categories of acts that are already proscribed by
territorial states but are mediated through online communities. These
wrongs pose little conceptual difficulty for territorial enforcement. Thus,
the important question here is not whether Mr. Bungle’s conduct should
be prohibited by the state, or whether new laws should be created
criminalizing virtual world exploits. The salient questions here are
whether and how territorial legal systems should impose punishments
for acts that are only wrongful because they breach a virtual commun-
ity’s shared understanding of the rules. Where communities are unable
to enforce their rules on their own, this question becomes more
166. See DIBBELL, supra note 11, at 24-25.
167. For example, one option is to require identification on subscription, usually based
upon a credit card system. This limits the access of minors, who often do not have credit
cards, and of those who cannot afford credit cards or the prospect of recurring bills and who
accordingly benefit from being able to use anonymous prepurchased game cards. See
Gyuhwan Oh & Taiyoung Ryu, Game Design on Item-selling Based Payment Model in
Korean Online Games, in SITUATED PLAY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 DIGITAL GAMES
RESEARCHASS’NCONFERENCE 650, 652-53 (2007), http://www.digra.org/d1/db/07312.20080.
pdf (arguing that limiting pseudonymous participation may also prove harmful for
communities where potential participants are hesitant to provide verifiable identifying
information in order to join, like communities that explore sensitive political values,
sexuality, or health topics).
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important: should territorial states lend their support to maintain the
integrity of consensual rules?
As virtual communities strive to address these tensions, providers
have turned to other legal doctrines, such as copyright law, to punish
and deter the breach of community rules. While it may be preferable to
deal with rule breakers internally within the community,168 that
approach does not provide a satisfactory answer where internal
punishment and deterrence prove to be insufficient or ineffective.
Territorial states must consider to what extent internal punishments
will be supported, and to what extent the state will intervene where
internal punishments are not effective. This suggests that territorial
states must also consider what to do when the internal rules lack
legitimacy, whether external enforcement should be available, and
whether internal enforcement should be restrained. The following
sections consider the applicability of a number of different areas of law
in fulfilling a punitive and deterrent role for virtual community rules.
B. Criminal Sanctions for Breach of Community Rules
The first point that must be dealt with is the possibility of criminaliz-
ing breaches of community rules. Criminal law is a good place to start,
as it is obviously the most concerned with imposing punishments for
wrongful behavior. Without the guarantees of process and accountability
that come with the full structure of territorial governance, however, the
rules created by virtual communities do not have the requisite legitima-
cy for the imposition of criminal sanctions by the state. The brief and
saddening example of the death of Megan Meier in the case of United
States v. Drew169 illustrates the theoretical and practical difficulties of
such a move.
Lori Drew, her daughter, and her employee created a fake MySpace
account, presented themselves as a teenage boy, Josh, and befriended a
thirteen-year-old girl, Megan Meier. Megan was a friend of Drew’s
daughter, and Drew created the account to gain Megan’s confidence and
find out how Megan felt about her daughter. After flirting with Megan
for over a month, Josh abruptly turned against Megan, eventually telling
168. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 316 (arguing that “the best avenue for the
preservation of the benefits of virtual worlds may be in policing virtual crimes without
outside assistance”); see also Brenner, supra note 134, at 60; Kerr, supra note 27, at 425.
169. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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her “[t]he world would be a better place without you.”170 Megan
committed suicide shortly after receiving that final message.171
The case sparked public outrage and launched a widespread debate
about whether new cyberbullying laws should be introduced.172 Drew
was eventually charged under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA),173 which prohibits intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization and obtaining information from a “protected
computer.”174 The prosecution alleged Drew was guilty of a misde-
meanor under that provision,175 and also of the aggravated felony
offense,176 because she intended to use the information to further the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.177 The prosecution
relied on the fact that the MySpace Terms of Service prohibited
harassment and abusive behavior, false registrations, soliciting personal
information from minors, and promoting information known to be false
and misleading to show that Drew’s access was unauthorized.178 In
November 2008, a jury found Drew guilty of the misdemeanor charge,
but acquitted her of the felony aggravated offense.179
In August 2009, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California acquitted Drew because intentional breach of a
site’s terms of service, without more, could not amount to a misdemeanor
violation of the CFAA.180 The court held that the contrary interpreta-
tion would render the criminal statute constitutionally void for being
vague.181 The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a rule of law based
constitutional doctrine that requires criminal laws to be adequately
particularized.182 The district court held that if the Terms of Service
alone were the basis of a criminal act under the CFAA, the provider
170. See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Matthew C. Ruedy, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should
Anti-Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 327-28 (2008).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 2010).
175. Id.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(2) (2006).
177. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 454.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 451.
180. Id. at 467.
181. Id.
182. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1997); McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
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would be, essentially, “the party who ultimately defines the criminal
conduct.”183
Drew highlights significant tensions between the validity and
enforceability of contractual terms of service and rules of virtual
communities. The case itself can be fairly characterized as a struggle to
find any punishment that could fit the perceived–but not crim-
inal–wrongdoing, but the method of bringing the criminal charge
threatened to support a new and undefined set of wrongs with the harsh
penalties of criminal law.184 The district court’s decision makes sense
from a rule of law perspective; the principle that a breach of the
contractual terms of use could amount to serious criminal conduct
directly conflicts with rule of law values of avoiding arbitrary punish-
ment185 and requiring a certain degree of predictability in the creation
and imposition of penalties.186 While the principle that breach of
contractual terms should not generally lead to criminal prosecution
seems correct, it highlights a significant outstanding question as to
whether and how internal wrongdoing ought to be punishable.
C. The Role of Compensatory Damages
The contractual governance framework provides only limited remedies
that are not always appropriate for governance purposes. The primary
remedy for breach of contract is compensatory damages,187 and puni-
tive or exemplary damages are not generally available.188 Breaches of
community rules either result in specific harm against specific individu-
als, in general or assumed harm to the society at large, or, where the
rules are mere technicalities, no real harm at all.189 Where there has
been actual, specific harm, contract law can provide a simple and
effective compensatory remedy. For example, where a participant
uploads content to Facebook that causes extreme loss or damage to
Facebook’s servers or its users’ computers,190 Facebook has a right, in
183. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 465.
184. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 423-24.
185. DICEY, supra note 29, at 188.
186. See FULLER, supra note 62, at 63-64; HAYEK, supra note 65, at 74-75; RAWLS,
supra note 63, at 239; Raz, supra note 65, at 198.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, at ch. 16, intro. note;
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.3 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2005).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 355.
189. See Brenner, supra note 134, at 8.
190. The Facebook terms of use prohibit uploading disruptive code. See FACEBOOK,
supra note 37, at cl. 3(4), (11) (“You will not upload viruses or other malicious code . . . .
You will not do anything that could disable, overburden, or impair the proper working of
Facebook, such as a denial of service attack.”).
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contract, to recover damages caused to its platform and any liabilities it
may incur to third parties as a result.191 A punitive remedy is not
available to Facebook, but Facebook may impose internal punishments
(up to and including terminating the participant’s account).192 An
external punishment is only available if the participant’s actions were
criminal,193 which will not necessarily be the case for many breaches
that may cause damage. Contractual damages accordingly fulfill an
important role in enforcement, but where compensatory damages are not
sufficient, contract law cannot adequately address all the issues that
arise out of breach of internal rules.
In cases where the harm is caused by profiting from breach of
community rules, such as the dupers discussed earlier, restitution may
provide a more appropriate remedy than compensatory damages,
although its application is not always straightforward. For example,
exploiting a bug to duplicate currency or items may look like criminal
counterfeiting,194 but assuming that it is not, it is difficult to identify
the harm under compensatory contractual damages. Apart from any
costs incurred in tracking down the resulting inflation, the provider has
not really suffered a loss, because currency is merely a series of entries
in its database that can be increased or decreased at any time. The
argument that the duper not be allowed to keep the extra currency
stems not from harm, but from two main claims: that if she were
permitted to keep it, there would be an incentive for future participants
to break the rules in a similar fashion and that it would be unjust to
allow her to keep her ill-gotten gains. In such a case, it may be possible
for a court to order disgorgement of profits made opportunistically
through exploiting a bug and selling the proceeds on the grey mar-
191. Provided that the loss is not too remote; the loss must be identifiable as a probable
result. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 351.
192. See FACEBOOK, supra note 37, at cl. 14.
193. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 2010) (creating an offense for
“intentionally [causing] damage without authorization, to a protected computer” by
knowingly transmitting harmful code or information).
194. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 315.
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ket.195 If that is possible, then the appropriate remedy would not be
compensatory but restitutive.
Significantly, contractual damages are not generally well-suited for
punishing breaches, and clauses that attempt to impose penalties are
generally unenforceable.196 Compensatory damages are especially
inappropriate to proscribe social wrongs–what Brenner calls “soft”
harms, as distinct from direct, “hard” harms to identifiable individu-
als.197 As these wrongs are often based on a presumption of harm,
they do not necessarily require actual harm to be wrongful.198 If a
participant breaches a contractual rule that only prohibits a soft harm,
it will be difficult to evaluate the harm caused and only nominal
damages may be available. For example, where a participant breaks a
rule that exists to protect the community at large, like a prohibition
against Real Money Trade (RMT), calculating damages is much more
difficult. The RMT may place upward pressure on inflation, which
causes harm to subscribers in unmeasurable amounts, but it also makes
the game more accessible to time-poor players, which benefits both the
provider and potentially the community. It may cause some players to
enjoy the game less, but it may cause others to enjoy the game more.
Quantifying the effect of the breach in these circumstances is likely to
195. See, e.g.,EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (Colo.
1995); see also Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise
in Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 115 (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2006); John D.
McCamus, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, 36 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 943 (2002); Lionel D. Smith, Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract:
Property, Contract and “Efficient Breach,” 24 CAN. BUS. L.J. 121 (1994). But see E. Allan
Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach
of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985) (arguing against disgorgement as a remedy in all but
a small set of limited circumstances). It is important to note that such a remedy should
properly be based in disgorgement damages under contract, rather than unjust enrichment.
See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1788
(2001) (explaining that culpability is an important factor in determining whether
disgorgement damages under contract should be available); James J. Edelman, Unjust
Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1878 (2001) (arguing for a
stronger distinction between unjust enrichment and disgorgement damages); Andrew Kull,
Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the Restatement of Contracts, 79
TEX. L. REV. 2021 (2000) (discussing disgorgement as a contractual remedy where the
breach is both profitable and opportunistic).
196. Contractual clauses that purport to impose a penalty for breach are generally
unenforceable unless they reflect a reasonable estimate of probable or actual loss. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 356.
197. Brenner, supra note 134, at 8.
198. Id. at 17.
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be prohibitively difficult, or at least extremely costly and time-consum-
ing.
Take, for example, the claim made in Hernandez v. Internet Gaming
Entertainment, Ltd.199 In Hernandez, Internet Gaming Entertainment,
Ltd. (IGE) was engaged in commercial gold farming200 in World of
Warcraft, and Hernandez sought to initiate a class action suit to obtain
both injunctive relief and monetary compensation.201 Hernandez
sought compensation for the lost time of WoW players who were forced
to farm more as a result of the devaluation of the virtual currency and
the increased competition for scarce resources.202 The monetary value
of the claim was calculated in United States Dollars at the rates of
exchange reflected on IGE’s own website.203 It seems very strange to
consider a claim in monetary damages circularly stated by a suit that
alleges that the primary wrong committed by IGE was its support of the
grey market that gives WoW gold its monetary value. Properly
characterized, the harm suffered by Hernandez and other players, if it
is made out, cannot be the diminution of the value of in-world assets
because their fundamental argument is that in-world assets ought not
to be monetized. Contractual damages seem to provide a wholly
inappropriate remedy in these circumstances. If Hernandez’s claim is
accurate, in that participants suffer through the long-term effects that
commercial gold farmers have on the community, the most appropriate
remedy would be injunctive relief, in order to require IGE to abide by
the community rules in future, or punitive, in order to deter future
similar breaches.
This reasoning holds for other cases where both the harm caused and
the benefit received are not easily quantifiable. In such cases, neither
contractual nor restitutive damages are likely to be appropriate. For
example, where people are harmed by the actions of griefers (partici-
pants who break community rules primarily to inflict suffering on
others), assessing damages is likely to be exceedingly difficult. Griefers
can cause tremendous harm to the community as a whole, even if the
specific harm they inflict on individuals never rises to the standards of
199. Amended Class Action Complaint, Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entm’t, Ltd.,
No. 07-21403-Civ-COHN/SNOW (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://dockets.justia
.com/docket/florida/flsdce/1:2007cv21403/296927/.
200. Gold farming, as a subset of Real Money Trading (RMT), refers to the practice of
carrying out repetitive tasks within a virtual world in order to earn virtual currency,
usually (pejoratively) with the goal of selling the currency on the grey market. See
generally DIBBELL, supra note 22.
201. See Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 199, at 1-2.
202. Id. at 10.
203. Id. at 7-8.
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emotional disturbance necessary to sustain damages in contract204 or
found an action in tort.205 In such circumstances, if the provider is
unable to sufficiently police the community through technological means
and direct supervision, the enjoyment of participants and the value of
the community may be seriously damaged, but no real compensation
would be available against any one participant.
Even where quantifiable harm or benefit is identifiable, however, there
will be cases where neither compensatory nor restitutive damages are
likely to provide a sufficient deterrent to breach of community rules. If
the threat of termination of a subscriber’s account does not provide
enough of a deterrent to prevent rulebreaking, presumably damages on
their own will not always be a sufficient deterrent either, considering the
low risk of a suit being filed and maturing to trial and the nonpunitive
nature of any potential award.206 There is accordingly a serious
tension where the standard contractual governance framework is not
always well-suited to addressing wrongdoing in virtual communities.
Where internal sanctions prove ineffective to punish and deter wrongdo-
ers, communities may need external support, and a purely compensatory
legal model will be inappropriate.
D. Punishment in Private Law
In order to circumvent the lack of punitive remedies and the difficulty
of showing harm in contract law, providers may prefer to sue under a
different theory of liability–often either copyright or tort. In virtual
communities that require the participant to install a software client to
access the platform, the right to install the software is usually made
conditional upon accepting the rules in an End User License Agreement
(EULA). This means that a proprietor may argue that accessing the
virtual community in breach of the contractual rules constitutes
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 353; CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 59.1.
205. An action for emotional distress in tort requires both “extreme and outrageous
conduct” and “severe emotional distress.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)
(1965); PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 55A.02 (Louis R. Frumer &
Melvin I. Friedman eds., 2011).
206. Fred von Lohman warns that the risk of an adverse costs order pursuant to
attorney-fee clauses common to many virtual community contracts do provide an
inequitable deterrent to breach of contractual rules where no quantifiable harm is able to
be shown. See Fred von Lohmann, Keynote Address at the Queensland University of
Technology Computer Games, Law, Regulation, Policy Symposium: Machinima: New
Creativity, Old Laws (Feb. 15, 2008), video available at http://blip.tv/testpattern/fred-von-
lohmann-at-the-computer-games-law-regulation-policy-symposium-2008-678271.
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copyright infringement.207 Suing under copyright law has a number
of advantages over suing under contract. As a preliminary matter,
copyright law does not require privity of contract and simplifies the
issuance of injunctive relief, two points we will return to later. The
primary advantage of copyright law for providers, however, is that it
decouples the damages award from the harm caused, allowing it to be
used as a punitive remedy.
If, for example, a participant breached the WoW Terms of Use that
prohibit participants from causing “distress, unwanted attention or
discomfort to any user,”208 a contractual assessment may determine
that damages are not available for discomfort, short of any actual loss
from victims who terminate their subscription. If, however, the
prohibition can be tied to copyright infringement, the harm assessed is
not the harm of the abusive behavior, but the harm of infringing
Blizzard’s intellectual property. The same principle holds for prohibi-
tions against RMT, as seen in Black Snow Interactive v. Mythic
Entertainment, Inc.,209 where Black Snow attempted to assert that its
commercial gold farming operation in Dark Age of Camelot did not
infringe Mythic’s copyrights.210 Julian Dibbell notes that the core
issue had nothing to do with copyright: “What mattered here wasn’t
whether Black Snow had or had not violated Mythic’s copyrights. What
mattered, rather–and mattered indeed–was whether Black Snow had or
had not done harm to the community to which they belonged by virtue
of their subscriptions to Dark Age of Camelot.”211
Dibbell argues that the contractual Terms of Service are much less
alienating than any claim based in copyright.212 While he acknowledg-
es that there are serious problems with the way that the contractual
terms are written and enforced, he points out that at least in some ideal
form, the terms represent a continuously negotiated social contract that
207. Melissa de Zwart, Piracy vs. Control: Models of Virtual World Governance and
Their Impact on Player and User Experience, 2 J. VIRTUALWORLDS RES. 3, 5 (2009) (noting
that the use of copyright to back the contractual terms is an “extremely powerful
mechanism”).
208. Blizzard, supra note 105, at cl. 9(b)(vi).
209. SA CV02-112GLT (ANx) (C.D. Ca. 2002).
210. The case never matured to trial, as Black Snow was dissolved before the case
could be heard. The district court did, however, grant Mythic’s application to compel
arbitration on the terms of service, which would likely have ended in Mythic’s favor. See
Black Snow Interactive, CV02-112GLT.
211. Julian Dibbell, Owned!: Intellectual Property in the Age of Dupers, Gold Farmers,
eBayers, and Other Enemies of the Virtual State, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND
VIRTUAL WORLDS 137, 142 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Noveck eds., 2006) (emphasis omitted).
212. Id. at 143-44.
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reflects the (admittedly flawed) bargaining process between the provider
and its participant subjects:
Weighing the case purely as a matter of intellectual property law, a
judge could certainly have determined the legality of eBaying once and
for all, but because the actual reasons Mythic and many of its
customers wanted the practice stopped had nothing ultimately to do
with intellectual property, any such ruling would have addressed those
reasons no more adequately than a coin toss. Ruling the EULA to be
a valid contract, on the other hand, would have sent the question back
where it belonged–into the much more finely tuned evaluative process
that is the ceaseless, grinding struggle between players and designers
over the shape of the game.213
This method of casting the actions of rulebreakers as copyright
infringement is not just alienating, but it also provides a means for the
provider to avoid the compensatory function of contractual damages and
impose punishments for breaches of internal rules. Indeed, the provider
need not even show harm of copyright infringement, as damage awards
can be calculated on a presumption of harm.214 The result is that, if
a remedy under copyright is available, it is likely to be much easier for
a provider to obtain a significant monetary award for breach of
community rules than under contract. Because the award of damages
is assessed in a way that is decoupled from the actual harm caused by
the breach and because copyright damages will, ex hypothesi, be
significantly higher than the nominal or compensatory damages that
would be available under contract, then the award will often perform a
punitive, rather than compensatory, function.
Punitive awards are also available as exemplary damages in tort if a
claim can be made out.215 For example, a participant who, in breach
of the rules of the community and without consent, takes another
participant’s virtual asset could be liable for conversion or trespass to
chattels216 if property in the asset can be established.217 Tort law
213. Id.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (providing for the imposition of statutory damages for
copyright infringement, ranging from $750 to more than $30,000 per work infringed).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 205, § 908(2) (“Punitive damages
may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or
his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”).
216. See John William Nelson, Recent Development, The Virtual Property Problem:
What Property Rights in Virtual Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and
Why They Are a Bad Idea, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 281 (2010) (considering the application
of conversion to virtual property disputes and arguing against the recognition of virtual
property rights); see also Allen Chein, Note, A Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1059 (2006); Garrett Ledgerwood, Note, Virtually Liable, 66 WASH. & LEE.
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has not yet been used as a significant theory of liability to enforce the
rules of virtual communities, and it would need to develop significantly
to cover intangible assets, but it could conceivably provide a similar
punitive element to enforcement of community rules in the future.218
There is a significant problem with relying on copyright or tort to
punish the breach of virtual community rules. In general, punishment
and deterrence form an important part of Western law. Where someone
willfully injures another,219 or commits a crime, we often expect not
only compensatory remedies, but punitive ones. It is likely that
participants in virtual communities also expect that those who break
community rules should be punished. Nevertheless, the external
imposition of penalties is highly problematic. The need to regulate
punishment and avoid arbitrary or unpredictable sanctions underpins
much rule of law theory.220 The rule of law imposes high standards for
the way in which criminal laws are created and enforced; it seems clear
enough that a person should not be prosecuted for breach of community
terms of service in the way in which prosecutors decided to charge Drew
L. REV. 811, 847-49 (2009) (examining the application of trespass to chattels to virtual
property).
217. There are some academic suggestions that there is no theoretical basis that
property rights should not be recognized in virtual assets. See Fairfield, supra note 80; F.
Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(2004). But see Steven J. Horowitz, Note, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443 (2007) (arguing that Lockean theory does not provide a strong
justification for virtual property rights); Nelson, supra note 216 (arguing against the
recognition of virtual property).
218. A number of cases involving disputes in virtual communities have alleged tortious
causes of action. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 1021
(2010), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 09-16044, 2011 WL
538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) (finding a triable issue of fact as to whether MDY was
liable for tortious interference with contract by creating and marketing Glider, a program
which helps World of Warcraft users cheat by automating their actions); In Game Dollar,
SACV07-0589 JVS (where a consent order was issued in settlement of a suit brought by
Blizzard against real money traders alleging, amongst other grounds, trespass to chattels
and tortious interference with contract); Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (where plaintiff
Marc Bragg sued Linden Lab for destroying the value of his in-world property alleging
conversion, amongst other grounds; the suit settled before the substantive issues could be
decided).
219. See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.02 (Matthew Bender 2011) (stating that
punitive damages in tort are available for punitive and deterrent purposes where the
wrongdoing is “sufficiently outrageous to warrant being characterized as malicious,
oppressive, fraudulent, willful, reckless or with conscious disregard, wanton or opprobri-
ous”).
220. See DICEY, supra note 29, at 188; FULLER, supra note 62, at 39; RAWLS, supra note
63, at 241; ALLAN, supra note 30, at 237-38; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
11 (1977); Raz, supra note 65, at 198.
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under the CFAA. This would risk a dangerous assertion–that otherwise
noncriminal acts, if done in violation of the terms of service, could
warrant criminal sanctions. The immediate rule of law problems are
obvious–the definition of what actions are criminally proscribed is
created by the provider in a contractual document, which is not subject
to legislative debate or process, can be modified by a private party
almost at will, and is not a rule of general application.221 There is also
a fundamental issue of proportionality, as the punishment (which was
designed for computer fraud) bears almost no relation to the act’s
seriousness, which varies greatly depending upon context.222
These rule of law limitations should also apply, with slightly lesser
force, to civil law actions that are essentially punitive in effect.
Although these actions do not result in incarceration, where the cost to
the participant is significantly higher than the damage caused, there is
still a very real punitive effect. Attorney-fee clauses,223 statutory
damages in copyright, and punitive damages in tort all have significant
punitive and deterrent effects on participants. Even without an explicit
punitive aspect, these private law remedies, by decoupling the calcula-
tion of damages from the actual harm in question, implicitly impose
punishments because the awards are likely to be much higher than those
that would be available under a compensatory contract evaluation. Rule
of law values of predictability and proportionality suggest that punitive,
as opposed to compensatory, damages ought not be available in actions
where wrongdoing reflects a breach of internal rules rather than a
specific tort or statutory wrong. For example, there is a clear difference
between a person who infringes copyright in a game by creating and
selling copies of the software and a person who technically infringes
copyright by continuing to play a legitimately acquired game in breach
of the gameplay rules embedded in the terms of service. The wrong in
the first case is copyright infringement; the wrong in the second is
breaking community rules. Damages for copyright infringement may
legitimately be available in the first, but should not be available in the
second. This distinction is not one of real harm versus virtual harm, but
rather a recognition that citizens ought not be punished for breaking
rules that are not legitimately created.
Viewing a wrong as copyright infringement, rather than as the wrong
it clearly is as seen through the interpretative framework of community
norms, places the full support of state copyright law behind the
relatively arbitrary rules created by the provider. From a rule of law
221. FULLER, supra note 62, at 48-51, 63-65.
222. See ALLAN, supra note 30, at 138.
223. See von Lohmann, supra note 206.
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perspective, it seems clear that the rules of virtual communities do not
have the legitimacy to justify punishing participants for their breach.
Unless and until we develop more comprehensive guarantees of
legitimacy to make and enforce rules in virtual communities, breaches
of those rules that do not amount to a distinct, clear, and promulgated
wrong should not be punishable by the territorial state.
The implication of this reasoning is that, as long as virtual communi-
ties are governed by contractual principles, it makes little sense to also
apply penalties drawn from other areas of private law. In this construc-
tion, breach of contract ought to be actionable in contract, not by
triggering underlying property rights in either copyright or tort.
Ensuring that only contractual remedies are available for breach of the
contractual terms of service means that participants are not subject to
the punitive effects of either criminal charges or civil damages discon-
nected from the wrongful act, whilst retaining the ability of providers
and others to recover genuine compensatory damages.
E. The Interplay Between Contract and Authorization in Tort and
Copyright
This reasoning suggests that contractual clauses that establish rules
for behavior in a virtual community should not generally be read to limit
the scope of authority to connect to the community. However, rules more
directly related to the infrastructure and resources of the provider, such
as requirements to pay a monthly subscription fee or only to connect
through authorized software clients, should condition authorization and
therefore enliven the underlying property rights on their breach.224 So,
for example, a MySpace rule against creating a false identity is a
community rule and should only be enforced contractually; its breach
does not make access to the MySpace service a criminal trespass.225
Conversely, acts like breaking the authentication system to gain access
to the community or gaining access to the servers in order to make
changes within the community are clearly outside the scope of authoriza-
tion and should result in potential liability under tortious and criminal
trespass.226
A similar distinction is applied under copyright, and courts attempt to
differentiate between contractual terms that condition the copyright
224. See Burk, supra note 3.
225. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467; see also Kristopher Accardi, Is Violating an Internet
Service Provider’s Terms of Service an Example of Computer Fraud and Abuse?: An
Analytical Look at the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Lori Drew’s Conviction and
Cyberbullying, 37 W. ST. U.L. REV. 67 (2009).
226. Burk, supra note 3.
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license grant, and those that are purely contractual in nature.227 The
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in
MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard228 directly addresses the difficulty
inherent in distinguishing between acts that implicate copyright
interests and those that only resonate in contract. MDY licenses Glider,
an automation bot that is designed to play World of Warcraft (WoW) on
behalf of its users. Glider has proved quite successful, allowing a small
proportion of players to avoid some of the repetitive tasks built in to
prolong the WoW experience. Like users who purchase virtual currency
to advance within the game in less time, Glider users are able to
advance their character and collect currency rewards with minimal
repetitive grinding. Blizzard, on the other hand, considers automation
to be cheating and actively attempts to seek out and ban participants
who are using Glider. Blizzard argued that it spends a large amount of
money responding to complaints and combating Glider and sought
instead a finding that MDY was liable for secondary copyright infringe-
ment, technological circumvention, and tortious interference with the
contracts between Blizzard and Glider users.229
Because a user must copy parts of the WoW program into memory in
order to play it, and users only have a right to copy as granted by the
software agreements,230 Blizzard argued that breach of the contractual
prohibitions on botting made that copying an infringement. At the
relevant time, Blizzard’s Terms of Use prohibited the use of “cheats,
bots, mods, and/or hacks, or any other third-party software designed to
modify the [WoW] experience.”231 The United States District Court of
227. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir.
1999). In Sun Microsystems, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that
[g]enerally, a copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license to use his
copyrighted material waives his right to sue the licensee for copyright infringe-
ment and can sue only for breach of contract. If, however, a license is limited in
scope and the licensee acts outside the scope, the licensor can bring an action for
copyright infringement.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
228. 629 F.3d 928 (2010), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 09-
16044, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011).
229. Id. at 934-36.
230. MDY users could not rely on the essential step defense in 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)
(2006) because WoW players were licensees, not owners, of the WoW software. MDY
Indus., 629 F.3d at 938-39 (citing Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (9th
Cir. 2010)).
231. Id. at 938 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The full clause, as of
December 9, 2007, can be seen at Blizzard, World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement,
TOSBACK (Dec. 9, 2007), http://www.tosback.org/version.php?vid=357.
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Arizona held that the clause was of the same class of copyright
limitations as rules that prohibit “copying, distributing, or modifying the
work,” and that using Glider was accordingly an infringement of
copyright.232 The Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, holding that
breach of a contractual term would sound in copyright “only where the
licensee’s action (1) exceeds the license’s scope (2) in a manner that
implicates one of the licensor’s exclusive statutory rights.”233 Because
using Glider does not involve one of the exclusive rights (no copies are
made other than the copies ordinarily made in the course of playing
WoW), the prohibition on botting can only be a contractual covenant, not
conditioned on the copyright license grant.234
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]ere we to hold
otherwise, Blizzard–or any software copyright holder–could designate
any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright infringement,
by purporting to condition the license on the player’s abstention from the
disfavored conduct.”235 This conclusion accords with our normative
framework by recognizing that breaking internal rules will generally be
treated as a contractual breach rather than copyright infringement, and
that copyright remedies will only lie to protect copyright interests. This
seems fundamentally correct; it would seem that the reason that
Blizzard would want to prohibit Glider has little to do with its copyright
interests and everything to do with enforcing internal rules against
automation and cheating. The arguments made at first instance by
Blizzard support such an inference:
Blizzard contends that Glider diminishes the value of WoW and causes
Blizzard to lose customers and revenue. Blizzard asserts that WoW is
a carefully balanced competitive environment where players compete
against each other and the game to advance through the game’s
various levels and to acquire game assets. Blizzard claims that Glider
upsets this balance by enabling some payers to advance more quickly
and unfairly, diminishing the game experience for other players.
Blizzard also contends that Glider enables its users to acquire an
inordinate number of game assets–sometimes referred to as “mining”
or “farming” the game–with some users even selling those assets for
232. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-D6C, 2008 WL
2757357, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (“The provisions of section 4 thus make clear that
although users are licensed to play WoW and to use the game client software while playing,
they are not licensed to exercise other rights belonging exclusively to Blizzard as the
copyright holder - copying, distributing, or modifying the work. The provisions are limits
on the scope of the license granted by Blizzard.”).
233. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 940.
234. Id. at 940-41.
235. Id. at 941.
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real money in online auction sites, an activity expressly prohibited by
the TOU.236
The harm that Blizzard is trying to address here is not the harm to
copyright interests that occurs when players who have already pur-
chased the game copy it into the memory of their computer, nor is it
really about the creation of interoperable programs, which Blizzard
explicitly supports through an open interface.237 The core problem
with Glider is that it helps people cheat and upsets the game balance.
This is, if properly construed, the harm of breaching internal rules, not
the harm of copyright infringement. It follows that the interests of
proportionality require that the remedies available should be contractual
remedies, not the disconnected remedies of copyright. The gameplay
rules of WoW are, essentially, consensual contractual agreements; to
expose rulebreaking participants to significant potential damages for
copyright infringement instead of a compensatory award under contract
would be extremely problematic in the way that the state would
essentially be imposing punishments for breach of rules unilaterally
determined by a private party.
The general principle here seems sound: copyright remedies ought to
be reserved for actions that threaten copyright interests and should not
be available to punish a breach of internal rules. The same general
principle would seem to apply for actions based in trespass. Requiring
harm to be shown and limiting remedies to compensatory damages
under contract ensures that the state does not back potentially
illegitimate internal rules with significant punishments.
F. The Need for an Alternative Approach
The conclusion that only compensatory damages should be available
for breach of internal rules is, on its own, somewhat problematic where
virtual communities cannot punish wrongs internally. As MDY
Industries demonstrates, the contractual power to terminate the
accounts of users will often not be sufficient to prevent widespread
breach of community rules. If rulebreaking users have a sufficiently
advanced means of attempting to avoid detection, those who find enough
benefit in breaking the rules will continue to do so. In MDY Industries
specifically, a remedy against MDY is still available under anti-
236. MDY Indus., 2008 WL2757357, at *1.
237. See Fairfield, supra note 89, at 462 (noting that Glider does not operate through
the official and regulated interface that Blizzard provides).
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circumvention law238 and, potentially, tortious interference with
contract.239 The tortious interference claim, in particular, may prove
to be a reasonably well-tailored means of preventing third parties from
creating tools designed to assist participants in breaching community
rules, as long as it does not extend to prohibit general purpose tools that
have other legitimate uses.
As against individual rulebreakers, however, the lack of an effective
external sanction may continue to prove problematic. Generally
speaking, if only compensatory remedies are available for breaches of
virtual community rules, there will be little legal deterrent to their
breach. Without effective internal sanctions, some communities are
likely to suffer a breakdown in the social order as participants have an
incentive to act opportunistically, breaking rules without fear of
punishment. This is essentially the doctrine of efficient breach in
contract: where a participant can benefit enough from breaching an
agreement to compensate any other parties for their loss, breaching the
agreement is Pareto optimal and ought to be encouraged.240 This
doctrine makes little sense from a rule of law perspective, which expects
that a community’s rules ought to be upheld regardless of whether it is
efficient to do so.241 H.L.A. Hart, in particular, has argued that for law
to be valid, it must be generally regarded as morally binding by the
community.242 A governance model that encourages opportunistic
breach is unlikely to engender internal support for community rules.
Even viewing the community from an external perspective and ignoring
238. The Ninth Circuit found that Glider’s evasion of Blizzard’s security and detection
algorithms circumvented Blizzard’s access control technical measures in contravention of
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006). MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 953-54. Note that this finding
relies on a problematic interpretation of a protected work, as the court found that the
technical measure only controlled access to the dynamic, nonliteral audiovisual display of
the game, not the fixed works that individually make up the game. See id. at 952-53.
239. In order to prevail on the tortious interference claim, Blizzard had to show that
MDY’s interference with the contractual relationship between Blizzard and its users was
improper. Based in part on MDY’s arguments that Glider was a useful program that
brought value to its users and did not compete directly with Blizzard’s service, the Ninth
Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact and vacated the district court’s
summary judgment, remanding the issues for trial. Id. at 955-56.
240. See OLIVERWENDELLHOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1923) (“The only universal
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages
if the promised event does not come to pass.”).
241. There may be a separate argument that societies ought not create inefficient rules
in order to maximize total welfare, but efficiency is not the sole measure of desirability in
any but the most extreme of libertarian ideal societies.
242. HERBERT LIONELADOLPHUSHART, THECONCEPT OFLAW 56 (1961) (discussing the
internal point of view and arguing that a “critical reflective attitude” that forms the
standard for acceptable behavior is necessary, at least for those enforcing the laws).
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the morality of the rules suggests that punishments may be necessary
in order to deter wrongdoing, and deterring wrongdoing is assumedly
necessary to allow the community to thrive.
There is a fundamental tension here, where communities seem to need
some external punitive powers in cases where participants can escape
internal punishment, but the state cannot legitimately impose those
punishments. This tension raises a significant question about whether
the territorial state ought to aid the provider, or the members of the
community, in enforcing the community rules. A wholly compensatory
approach is likely to be ineffective in deterring wrongdoing where the
wrongdoer is able to escape punishment within the community, but a
punitive approach unjustifiably risks elevating community rules almost
to the status of criminal law. Increasing the legitimacy of private
governance may make the imposition of penalties appropriate, but doing
so would likely remove a great deal of the autonomy that makes these
communities attractive in the first place.243 If the contractual frame-
work is to be retained, the best answer seems to be to reject the private
internal/public external dichotomy and instead encourage legitimate
internal governance procedures and empower communities to enforce
their rules, rather than necessarily relying on the coercive power of the
territorial state, at least at the first instance.
IV. EMPOWERING COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE THROUGH
EQUITABLE RELIEF
There are twomain scenarios under which neither internal governance
nor compensatory contractual damages are likely to be effective. The
first occurs where the provider has wrongfully terminated a participant’s
access and refuses to review the decision or reinstate her account. The
second involves enforcement against participants for whom internal
enforcement poses little deterrence. Primary examples are griefers or
commercial actors who can create new accounts and internal identities
as required, or individuals interested in short-term goals who have no
intention of participating in a community after their wrongdoing has
been discovered–such as exploiters and dupers who are able to make
significant profits and cash out. In both scenarios, the equitable
enforcement of the contractual rules is likely to provide better outcomes
than merely compensatory damages, without requiring courts to seek
punitive remedies under criminal law, copyright, or other private law.
243. See Balkin, supra note 88; Bartle, supra note 30; Castronova, supra note 30.
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A. Specific Performance to Reinstate a Participant’s Access
The equitable remedy of specific performance is likely to be much more
appropriate than damages in enforcing community rules against
providers. Fairfield proposes a hypothetical example, where a corporate
participant like IBM has their access to Second Life wrongfully
terminated, losing their virtual land and presence.244 The appropriate
remedy in this case would be specific performance, an order requiring
Linden to restore IBM’s virtual property and access. This is a much
more attractive option than compensatory damages, which would have
to include calculations either for the loss of goodwill and future
marketing potential or the lost investment in developing the virtual
space.
This argument does not apply only to corporate participants; in many
cases where a participant seeks to enforce the community rules against
the provider, she will often prefer compliance over compensation for
breach. For example, if a participant whose account has been wrongfully
terminated brought suit to enforce the contract, a wholly compensatory
award would be unlikely to provide an effective remedy. It is common
in virtual community contracts to limit any amount recoverable to the
amount paid under the contract.245 If viewed as a pure consumer
transaction, compensation for loss of access to a virtual community can
be valued at the relatively low price of the subscription fee–perhaps $15
per month.246 Valuing access to the community at the market price for
provision of access, however, ignores the social aspect of what makes
virtual communities much more important than passive entertain-
ment.247 The argument here is that participation in a virtual commu-
nity is sufficiently important to warrant property rule protection, rather
than being subject only to much more fragile compensatory liability rule
protection.248 For many participants in many communities, the social
244. Fairfield, supra note 89, at 459.
245. Andrew Jankowich, EULAw: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in
Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 51-2, Annex A Nos. 59 and 73 (2006)
(showing that 92% of virtual world contracts limit the liability of the provider, and 23% of
contracts surveyed limit a participant’s remedy to terminating the contract and quitting
the virtual world).
246. See Zaffron et al., supra note 99.
247. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 135 (“The common framing of games as ‘simply entertain-
ment’ often obscures the ways they act as key cultural sites in which forgoing participation
may have real costs.”).
248. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Guido
Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2203-04
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connections they have forged and the identity they have constructed
within the community makes access much more personally important
than a purely fungible consumer transaction.249 In these circumstanc-
es, an award of specific performance will likely be more appropriate than
an award of damages.
The willingness of courts to award specific performance will depend
greatly upon the identification of this gap between a compensatory
award and the value of access to the community to the subscriber. If
compensatory damages are clearly not adequate to remedy the harm
that the subscriber has suffered, specific performance may be avail-
able.250 In many such cases, since the harm suffered by the partici-
pant is exceedingly difficult to quantify, specific performance is likely to
provide a much simpler and more certain remedy.251 Importantly,
virtual communities are rarely substitutable; we can draw an analogy
to contracts for unique goods, where specific performance is generally
muchmore appropriate than damages because the plaintiff cannot easily
replace the good in question.252 In much the same way, a participant
whose friends all gather in one community cannot easily replicate her
social network in another, even if there is a reasonably similar
competitor.
Importantly, specific performance will often not be granted if the
participant is in breach of the contract. Bragg, for example, may not
qualify for specific performance if he did in fact break the rules,
although the court will look to the seriousness of the breach and whether
(1997) (discussing the importance of social choice between property and liability rules for
theft and breach of contract); Richard A. Epstein, Clear View of The Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2098 (1997) (arguing that a remedy of
specific performance is often more appropriate than damages under contract in
circumstances other than purely financial transactions).
249. See Suzor, supra note 8.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 359.
251. See id. § 360 cmt. b (damages are likely to be inadequate where it is too difficult
to estimate loss with reasonable certainty); see also Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (arguing that specific performance should be
routinely available); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 975 (2005) (arguing that specific performance should be more available in certain
situations). Contra Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 1349 (2009) (arguing against a general entitlement to specific performance where
compensatory damages are available).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 360 cmt. c (specific
performance more appropriate where no suitable substitute is readily available).
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the plaintiff ’s conduct would render specific performance inequitable.253
This seems desirable; because rule of law values support the enforcement
of community rules, specific performance should be denied to partici-
pants like Bragg if the court found that, by exploiting a bug to illicitly
obtain land, he had violated a core term of the agreement and that, as
a result, his access to the community was validly terminated. Assuming
the rule was valid and that Linden did not act inappropriately in
terminating his access, Bragg’s only remedy should be compensatory in
nature.
One major doctrinal stumbling block to the award of specific perfor-
mance of virtual community contracts lies in courts’ reluctance to make
orders requiring ongoing judicial supervision.254 While specific perfor-
mance of personal service contracts is not generally available,255 it is
unclear whether the same objections hold for virtual community
contracts. Courts may be wary of ordering specific performance of such
an ongoing contract because of the potential requirement of ongoing
supervision and a general wariness against forced association.
Nevertheless, at least in the larger communities, an order that the
participant’s account be reinstated may finally resolve the dispute
between the parties. Still, there will always be a risk that the contract
will be breached again in the future. This is particularly likely where
the remedy can be framed as a requirement that the defendant achieve
a specifiable result, such as an order requiring the provider to restore
assets wrongfully confiscated.
More problematically, specific performancemay not be available where
there is no guarantee of the plaintiff ’s performance because it would be
unfair to bind the defendant, but leave him or her only a remedy in
damages should the plaintiff not complete the transaction. Historically,
mutuality has required that the remedy of specific performance must be
hypothetically available against the plaintiff before the court will order
the defendant’s performance.256 There have been so many exceptions
253. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 1175 (explaining that “[a] plaintiff who
has made a wilful and inexcusable repudiation of his own contractual duty should never
be given a decree for specific performance against the other party unless he retracts the
repudiation before any material change of position by the other party in reliance thereon”).
254. Id. § 1171 (“[A] decree for specific performance should not be granted if the court
is going to be unable to enforce it effectively or to pass an intelligent judgment on the
question whether its order has been obeyed in good faith.”).
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 367.
256. See J.B. Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1903)
(arguing for the reformulation of the requirement of mutuality).
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drawn to this rule,257 however, that it may be more accurate to use the
more general construction that “the defendant will not be compelled to
perform specifically unless he is reasonably well secured with respect to
the agreed exchange for his performance.”258
Under the stronger form of the rule, because the court could not force
a participant to remain active in a virtual community, specific perfor-
mance of the provider’s promise to allow access may be denied. This is
the likely result under current doctrine, where courts have often denied
specific performance of contracts where the plaintiff ’s consideration is
the performance of some personal service.259 Two important consider-
ations, however, tend to weigh against this conclusion. First, the
provider’s risk would have to be weighed against the past performance
of the participant, who will usually have already invested significant
time in the virtual community. To the extent that the requirement of
mutuality is based upon ensuring appropriate security to the defendant
in case of the plaintiff ’s future breach, it would seem that such past
investment might provide substantial security.260 Second, and perhaps
more importantly, there is a clear qualitative difference between the
benefits that participants and (large) providers get from a monthly
subscription contract. While damages are not likely to be adequate to
compensate a participant for loss of access to the community, damages
will usually be wholly adequate to compensate the provider for the loss
of the participant’s subscription fee.261
While there is still a great deal of uncertainty, the availability of
specific performance may accordingly turn on the characterization of the
257. See Edgar Noble Durfee, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 20 MICH. L. REV. 289,
291 (1922) (noting that “the exceptions literally ate up the rule”).
258. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 1181.
259. See, e.g., Roller v. Weigle, 261 F. 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (denying a remedy for
specific performance because the plaintiff could not be compelled to act as managing
director of a corporation and therefore ordering the defendant’s performance would not be
mutual, despite the plaintiff’s assurance that he was “ready and willing to perform every
agreement and undertaking on his part to be performed”).
260. See, e.g., Newman v. French, 116N.W. 468, 469-70 (Iowa 1908) (injunction granted
to prevent sale of property “so long as plaintiff continues to perform or to be ready and able
to perform the contract on her part”); Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia, 5 S.C. 225,
246-47 (1873) (granting specific performance on a contract to supply water where the
plaintiff had already invested significantly in the creation of infrastructure); see also
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 1189 (“There may have been such a part
performance, or such an investment of funds or labor in preparation to perform, that the
refusal of specific performance will leave the plaintiff a heavy loser.”).
261. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 1186 (arguing that “[t]here are cases
in which the security may be sufficient, even though no legal remedy other than damages
may be available in case of a later breach by the plaintiff”).
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participant’s performance. If the performance expected by the provider
is merely the payment of a monthly fee, then no additional security is
likely to be necessary. In fact, because subscription fees are generally
paid in advance, the provider is not likely to suffer significant harm if
the participant does not return to the community. If, on the other hand,
the provider expects active participation in the community, the
participant’s assertion that she is ready, willing, and able to re-enter the
community may not be sufficient. This construction, however, seems to
be a distortion of the nature of virtual community contracts. Providers
do not, generally speaking, contract with participants to add their
personal skill and labor to the community; more commonly, the provider
makes a service available to the participant regardless of the level of the
participant’s involvement within the community. Certainly, the provider
derives some additional benefit from each participant who adds to the
community, but given that there are often thousands, if not millions, of
active users, the marginal value provided by any one participant is
usually quite small. It would seem then, at least in the larger communi-
ties where the provider is unlikely to notice whether the participant is
active or not, that specific performance should not be withheld for lack
of mutuality. In such cases, sufficient security should be available if the
court makes the order for specific performance conditional on the
participant’s concurrent performance of her obligation to pay the
monthly subscription fee.262
Where a participant’s access has been wrongfully terminated, specific
performance would provide a remedy that is, in general, much more
appropriate than damages. Damages for the loss of a participant’s
262. See Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 F. 603, 609
(7th Cir. 1917) (“If specific performance be otherwise proper, equity is no longer deterred
from granting its aid because of a so-called lack of mutuality in the remedy. It suffices that
defendant’s compulsory performance is conditioned upon plaintiff’s continued readiness to
carry out his obligation.”); Montgomery Traction Co. v. Montgomery Light & Power Co., 229
F. 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1916) (“[B]y the terms of the decree appealed from the defendant is
left at liberty to cease performance whenever a default by the plaintiff occurs. Specific
performance by it is required only so long as there shall be like performance by the
plaintiff. It seems that where, as in the instant case, the reciprocal obligations of the
parties to the contract in question are concurrent, the continuance of the obligation of each
to perform his part being dependent upon continued performance by the other, any
material injury which otherwise might be sustained by the defendant, of whom
performance is required, in consequence of his not having an efficient remedy for coercing
future performance by the plaintiff, is effectually avoided by making the defendant’s
obligation to continue performance dependent upon a continuance of performance by the
plaintiff. The conclusion is that the circumstances of the instant case fairly negative the
conclusion that the decree appealed from involved the inequitable result, the avoidance of
which is the prime object of the rule as to mutuality of remedies.”).
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connection to her friends and family, to her personal expression in her
virtual persona, and to the non-fungible virtual assets in her possession
are highly uncertain and difficult to quantify. An order to reinstate her
access, on the other hand, can be complied with quickly and with little
difficulty. While specific performance is unlikely to be available to
prevent a provider from terminating a virtual community in its
entirety,263 it should, in appropriate circumstances, be available to
require a provider to reinstate access to a particular participant. Such
an approach is somewhat unfamiliar in contract law, but virtual
community contracts do not fit within the traditional contractual
paradigm, and courts may be willing to extend the remedy in certain
circumstances. If it proves possible, specific performance would seem to
provide a better remedy than damages in many situations where a
participant’s access has been unlawfully terminated.
B. Injunctive Relief
Equitable relief is also likely to keep participants out in situations
where internal punishment is not sufficient to deter wrongdoing within
the community. A useful example can be found in the case of Blizzard
v. In Game Dollar, LLC,264 which involved prohibited RMT and
spamming where the defendant had largely avoided the provider’s bona
fide efforts to enforce the rules. Blizzard brought suit against In Game
Dollar (IGD), the operator of peons4hire.com, for advertising gold sales
and power-leveling services.265 Blizzard regularly enforces a rule
against advertising commercial services within the community and
routinely suspends and bans those advertisers that it identifies.266
Blizzard alleged that IGD, however, would continuously create new
accounts and evade Blizzard’s attempts to prevent them from advertis-
ing.267 Frustrated, Blizzard filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California and asked the district court
to grant an injunction to prevent IGD from accessing the communi-
ty.268 Blizzard alleged that the advertising spam “had a serious impact
on the WoW game” because commercial advertisements detract from the
immersive effect of the game, social interactions between participants
263. See Meehan, supra note 118, at 40-41; cf. Balkin, supra note 88, at 2071
(discussing the idea of a bankruptcy trustee taking over a game as a “direct result of
designing the game to allow real-world commodification and propertization”).
264. Complaint, supra note 5.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 4.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id. at 2, 11-12.
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are disrupted by spam, and the “performance of the game is degraded
because [of] the vast quantities of messages” sent by the defendants.269
Blizzard then alleged it had suffered harm through “lost subscription
revenue from players who leave in frustration,” “increased system costs
due to higher bandwidth and server usage,” “costs of developing
technological measures” in an attempt to stop spammers, and “increased
customer service costs needed to respond to dissatisfied players.”270
The complaint specifically noted that Blizzard’s self-help efforts had
failed: “[d]espite significant expenditures of time and money, Blizzard
has been unable to stop Defendants’ onslaught of spam messages.”271
Blizzard alleged that, by sending spam messages, IGD violated
computer fraud statutes,272 committed the torts of intentional interfer-
ence with contract and trespass to chattels, was unjustly enriched, and
engaged in unfair competition.273 Curiously, Blizzard did not allege
breach of contract. Blizzard sought a permanent injunction restraining
IGD from connecting to WoW servers and selling items or gold, as well
as damages, an account of profits, and costs and attorneys’ fees.274 The
suit settled before it proceeded to trial; in a consent order, Blizzard was
granted a permanent injunction that would prevent IGD from advertis-
ing any business in WoW and selling virtual assets or power leveling
services.275
In Game Dollar illustrates the difficulty that providers can face in
enforcing the rules against determined participants for whom the threat
of account termination holds no real deterrence. An award of damages
in circumstances where the provider is unable to prevent a participant
from accessing the community or breaching the rules is unlikely to be
particularly useful from a governance perspective, and especially so
where the compensatory damages are difficult to calculate. Consider, for
example, what the operators of LambdaMOO could do to prevent a
griefer like Mr. Bungle from continuously creating new characters and
disrupting the community. Damages are unlikely to be available; the
harm caused by griefing is unlikely to ever be taken seriously enough in
the general community to justify identifying and quantifying it.
Properly conceptualized, the greatest harm is the threat to the integrity
269. Id. at 5-6.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 5.
272. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006); California Computer Data Access and
Fraud Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2010).
273. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
274. See Complaint, supra note 5.
275. See Consent Order, supra note 5.
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of the community rules, which a compensatory monetary award is
unlikely to properly address. In these circumstances, it may be that the
interests of equity favor issuing an injunction to empower community
governance practices.
Richard Epstein has argued that, where a provider’s self-help remedy
is not sufficient to keep out unwanted participants, a court should
almost never deny an injunction to support the provider’s control over its
platform.276 In the context of the Intel Corp. v. Hamidi277 case,
where Intel sought an injunction to prevent an ex-employee from
sending email to its current employees, Epstein argues that the default
rule ought to be that “whenever self-help is allowed, then the injunctive
relief may follow to the same effect.”278 In Epstein’s construction,
providers in Blizzard’s position have one of three options: (1) they can
ignore the harm caused by the unwelcome user, (2) they can seek to deal
with the user themselves, or (3) they can ask the state to help. The first
option is unattractive, as it could result in potentially significant harm
to the community. The second option is also unattractive because it
results in a “wasteful cat-and-mouse game”; the provider is forced to
spend more resources in attempts to prevent the intruder from accessing
the service and the intruder spends more resources evading those
attempts, creating an arms race.279 It follows, for Epstein, that the
state ought to help the provider and should enjoin the intruder from
accessing the service.280
Lastowka, on the other hand, is not convinced and argues that only a
compensatory remedy should be available–agreeing with the result in
Hamidi that Hamidi’s claim must fail because Intel could not show
actual harm to their servers.281 Lastowka warns that asking territori-
al states to intervene involves a difficult determination:
[I]f the law takes any given cat and mouse game seriously enough to
intervene, it must ultimately choose between cats and mice–and the
law is not always able to do this confidently. In such cases, we often
leave new technologies alone, and the cats and mice are left to the
survival of the fittest.282
276. See Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 147 (2005).
277. 71 P.3d 296 (2003).
278. Epstein, supra note 276, at 168.
279. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 249 (2001), rev’d 71 P.3d 296 (2003).
280. Epstein, supra note 276, at 151; see also David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble
and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 109, 123 (2005).
281. Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 39-40, 64 (2007).
282. Id. at 64.
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The problem with this scenario is not its resolution but the process by
which we arrive at that resolution. We may be able to agree that in
certain circumstances Blizzard ought to be able to prevent IGD from
repeatedly breaching its rules, and that the territorial state should grant
an injunction. There is a crucial danger, however, of extrapolating from
this the proposition that providers should always be able to obtain
injunctive relief in order to enforce community rules. This is the danger
Lastowka is correct to warn about–that it is often very difficult to
determine whether or not it is desirable to intervene in any given
situation. If, in coming to this conclusion, we determine that injunctive
relief should always be available, we will have determined not only that
the cat and mouse game is wasteful, but that “the cats . . . should
always win.”283
Lastowka argues that it is often too difficult for courts to determine
whose interests should prevail in such a situation, and that it is
preferable for the state to err on the side of inaction and decline to
intervene.284 Lastowka makes this argument in the context of the
potential development of cyberproperty rights in Hamidi, where Intel
operated a publicly available email server to which Hamidi and any
other member of the public could connect in order to send messages to
Intel employees.285 The context of virtual communities is different, in
that participants are usually in a contractual relationship with the
provider, and the provider has a much stronger general power to exclude
unwanted participants. Transposing this debate to virtual communities
highlights a different set of concerns to those that center around
openness of internet protocols and network neutrality.286 In virtual
community disputes, a policy of inaction–not aiding either the partici-
pant or the provider in the enforcement of the contract–is likely to lead
to unsatisfactory results where either the provider is able to wield
disproportionately greater power and unfairly eject participants or where
the participant is able to avoid the enforcement of the legitimate rules
of the community. On the other hand, a policy that always supports the
provider’s exercise of power with the full injunctive weight of the state
risks over-strengthening the provider’s position. It seems to follow that
the only desirable alternative is for territorial states to attempt to
283. Id. at 66.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 65-66.
286. See DanHunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521
(2003); Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV.
433 (2003).
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determine when self-help is legitimate and permissible, when it should
be restrained, and when it should be supported with injunctive relief.
Epstein’s argument is too strong to the extent that it is not sensitive
to the important instances where we may determine that self-help ought
not to be available. Epstein bases his argument on efficiency, but a
simple utilitarian analysis does not provide much help. Clearly, in In
Game Dollar, there is some value to the spammer in sending the
messages, and there is likely to be some value to those members of the
community who purchase the goods or services in response to the
advertisement–or, presumably, sending themessages would not be worth
the spammer’s time. As was the case in Hamidi, there is little direct
harm to Blizzard’s infrastructure, as the messages are likely to form only
an insignificant proportion of the traffic that passes over the net-
work.287 There are some negative externalities imposed by these
communications, in that presumably the messages reach participants in
the community who do not wish to be exposed to commercial messages.
There will be some costs to the provider in terms of customer service, in
enforcing the rules and in dealing with complaints from subscribers.
There may also be direct revenue costs to the provider from lost
subscriptions as frustrated participants terminate their own ac-
counts.288 Finally, there may be costs to the community as a whole, as
commercial communications diminish the purity of the community fiction
and general respect for the community rules. Whether these costs, in
the aggregate, outweigh the benefits that the spammer and her clients
receive from the communications is an open question.
This example may be somewhat skewed because we have elsewhere
drawn the assumption that unsolicited commercial messaging is
harmful, leading to the introduction of anti-spam legislation around the
world.289 To use a different example, consider the communications
287. The court decision in Hamidi noted that the spam messages were only a tiny
fraction of total network traffic, and thus no harm could be found. See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at
305-06.
288. There may, of course, also be direct gains to the provider from subscribers who are
frustrated with “grinding” for advancement within the game and resolve to continue their
subscription because they are able to pay a third party to avoid the time-consuming
process. These gains, though difficult to quantify, would have to be accounted for in any
utilitarian or compensatory evaluation.
289. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006); Directive on Privacy and Electronic Commun-
ications 2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L201) 31.7 (EU), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:NOT; see also Evangelos Moustakas,
C. Ranganathan&PennyDuquenoy,Combating Spam Through Legislation: a Comparative
Analysis of US and European Approaches (2005), http://cite seerx.ist.psu. edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.84.4690&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Guido Schryen,Anti-spam Legislation:
An Analysis of Laws and Their Effectiveness, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 1 (2007).
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made by Peter Ludlow criticizing Electronic Arts’ governance of The
Sims Online.290 This is a case somewhat similar to that of Hamidi,
where Hamidi was sending messages critical of Intel to Intel’s employ-
ees, except that, unlike Hamidi, Ludlow’s messages were directed not at
employees but customers, participants, and community members. In
fact, the content of Ludlow’s messages were not made directly within the
community; he merely linked to his online newspaper in his avatar’s
profile. Ludlow’s free speech claims may be stronger than Hamidi’s
because of the community context, although neither is easily recogniz-
able within a constitutional framework that predominantly privileges
only public speech.291 If Electronic Arts (EA) sought an injunction to
prevent Ludlow from breaching a term that prohibits linking to external
news sites, it is not clear whether it would be just, in all the circum-
stances, for a court to issue it. Similarly, if Ludlow were to seek specific
performance of the contract, there are difficult questions of what the
interests of justice would require that cannot be legitimately ignored and
cannot be simply determined from a literal interpretation of the contract.
Lastowka is correct in that the task of actually mapping a distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate exercises of power is dauntingly
difficult. Nevertheless, some attempt is warranted as, at least in the
context of virtual communities, a blanket policy of non-intervention is
likely to harm communities and participants and will, at any rate, only
reinforce the underlying power asymmetries of the contract and property
model.292 Viewing the exercise of equitable discretion in terms of a
rule of law framework is useful to help us conceptualize the competing
tensions; our regulatory policy ought to encourage the diversity and
strength of virtual communities but should ensure that the governance
of these communities is legitimate. James Grimmelmann has pointed
out that the best arguments for supporting community rules will be
made from the perspective of legitimacy and community values,293
rather than relying on a basic property rights or utilitarian economic
analysis. We see, in this context, that it is important that providers and
participants are able to create a relatively autonomous environment with
290. PETER LUDLOW & MARK WALLACE, THE SECOND LIFE HERALD: THE VIRTUAL
TABLOID THAT WITNESSED THE DAWN OF THE METAVERSE 145-48 (2007).
291. SeeBalkin, supra note 88, at 2074-75 (“As presently interpreted, First Amendment
law does not protect the interests of the game players against the actions of the platform
owner or game designer because the platform owner is not a state actor. If anything,
American free speech law will tend to reinforce the contractual and property rights of
platform owners to control the structure of the game through the TOS or EULA.”).
292. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
293. Grimmelmann, supra note 84.
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norms of their choosing.294 In order to do so, the community must be
able to enforce its rules. The argument for injunctive relief, then, comes
most strongly from the proposition that without the assistance of the
state, the community is unable to enforce its own (legitimately created)
rules, predominantly because the lack of physical embodiment makes it
difficult to punish and permanently exclude offenders.295
I have argued previously that if states simply enforce the contractual
rules as written, without regard to community norms, they will be
unlikely to provide desirable outcomes.296 Failing to enforce the rules,
however, may lead to disastrous consequences for a community that is
unable to police itself–at the limiting case, a complete breakdown of the
social order may well cause the community to collapse entirely.
Sustained lawlessness, if it is unable to be dealt with within the
community, is likely to cause participants to leave; if enough quit and
the costs of enforcing the rules and maintaining the community exceeds
the benefits to the provider, it is likely to shut down the physical and
software platform infrastructure and extinguish the community. In
circumstances short of the limiting case, the community may continue
to exist, but the provider may incur substantial additional costs in
combating rule-breakers, or the community as a whole may suffer by
either the increased lawlessness or the increased security measures that
are initiated to combat it. If the development of virtual communities is
to be encouraged, states may need to assist in enforcing the rules when
required.
Importantly, however, empowering communities to enforce their rules
can also result in the state providing legitimacy and authority to
undesirable governance practices.297 We should be very sensitive to
the legitimizing power of the state in making an injunctive remedy
available, and ensure, as best as possible, that the external enforcement
294. See Balkin, supra note 88; Bartle, supra note 30; Castronova, supra note 30; David
R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders–The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (1996); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27.
295. This reasoning explains, to a large extent, the reliance of providers on contractual
arrangements for setting out rules of participation. Although the rhetoric of the early
cyberlibertarians delegitimized the role of the state in cyberspace self-governance, internal
governance arrangements depend and structure themselves upon territorial regimes of
property and contract. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 292, at 1296-97; see also
Grimmelmann, supra note 84 (noting the tension between arguments that virtual spaces
should be free from territorial regulation and calls for states to aid in enforcing the rules
of virtual worlds).
296. See Suzor, supra note 8; see also Nicolas Suzor, On the (Partially) Inalienable
Rights of Participants in Virtual Communities, 130 MEDIA INT’L AUSTL. 90 (2009).
297. Radin & Wagner, supra note 292, at 1296-97.
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of internal rules does not support illegitimate governance. The risk here
is not as great as with the imposition of criminal sanctions or civil
damages awards as, although injunctive relief is backed by the court’s
criminal powers, it will attach to future actions, not past breaches.
Because granting injunctive relief does not punish past behavior, there
are less concerns about the legitimacy of enforcing community rules in
general, although we should nevertheless be careful to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate rules in particular cases in the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
The rule of law analysis suggests that legitimately created internal
rules ought to be enforceable. Where the rules are not enforceable
within the community–in cases where the rule-breaking participant is
otherwise immune from the deterrent effect of internal punishments–the
state may need to intervene to assist in their enforcement in the
interests of community integrity. Because punitive measures are
inappropriate and compensatory damages are inadequate, if the
contractual framework is to properly address these governance tensions,
injunctive relief should be available to allow communities to enforce
their rules where they otherwise would not be able to. The great
challenge, however, for a court exercising the equitable discretion to
award injunctive relief, will be to differentiate legitimate rules and
exercises of discretion from illegitimate ones.
Epstein’s position, that injunctive relief should always be available, is
too severe and risks harming participants; but Lastowka’s argument,
that states ought not prefer either participants or providers, does not
translate adequately to virtual communities, which may be severely
damaged by inaction. Ideally, then, we may say that it would be
desirable to enforce the rules where we deem them to be good rules, but
we ought not encourage or support bad rules by lending the weight of
the state to enforce them. The difficulty of differentiating acceptable
from unacceptable rules, however, is significant; much of liberal theory
is justifiably wary of governments deciding which agreements ought to
be enforced and which ought not.298 The risk of error is great, particu-
larly dealing with novel issues arising out of virtual communities.299
This risk of error appears to be the primary reason that both Epstein
298. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 389 (1979).
299. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27, at 315-16 (arguing that “[s]ome degree of
confusion and category mistake seem inevitable if traditional criminal law is applied to
behaviors in virtual worlds. Ironically, the best avenue for the preservation of the benefits
of virtual worlds may be in policing virtual crimes without outside assistance”); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207;
Johnson & Post, supra note 294.
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and Lastowka argue that the required analysis is not worth attempting,
and that we may be better off either granting absolute property rights
to providers or refusing to entertain virtual disputes respectively.300
Both of these options are less than appealing. As I have argued, there
is great risk in defining property rights where we are unsure that they
are necessary, desirable, or effective. However, doing nothing risks
condemning at least some virtual communities to a lawless purgatory
where they are unable to develop into the vibrant and promising
communities of our imagination. The answer must lie in recognizing the
interdependence of the real and the virtual and attempting to craft rules
that allow communities to flourish.301 A normative framework that is
based in legitimacy of community governance is able to help in this
difficult evaluation by providing a basis from which to consider both the
needs of providers and participants in forming autonomous communities
and the tensions that revolve around restraint on the exercise of
governance power. While we may not be able to easily distinguish good
rules from bad rules, we can arrive at an approximation of legitimacy;
the more legitimate a given rule is in a given community, the stronger
the argument is that territorial states ought to help enforce that
rule.302 It is on this basis that the discretion inherent in equitable
remedies should be exercised to provide injunctive support to communi-
300. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84 (2003) (“No
compulsory license scheme, even with compensation, could hope to match the level of
particularization and standardization achieved by contract.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra
note 27, at 316 (expressing concern that legal rules will not strike an appropriate balance,
and that virtual worlds may best be served by dealing with disputes internally); Lastowka,
supra note 281, at 65-66 (arguing that the difficulty in determining conflicts suggests that
law is not currently suited to resolving disputes); see also Easterbrook, supra note 299, at
215-16 (arguing that “[e]rror in legislation is common, and never more so than when the
technology is galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to
an evolving world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to permit
the participants in this evolving world to make their own decisions. That means three
things: make rules clear; create property rights where now there are none; and facilitate
the formation of bargaining institutions. Then let the world of cyberspace evolve as it will,
and enjoy the benefits.”).
301. Grimmelmann, supra note 84 (arguing that “[u]ltimately, what justifies
maintaining independent virtual worlds is the same as what justifies intruding on their
independence–some community somewhere would suffer if we didn’t. These conflicts
between communities will not always be easy to resolve, but the overall prospects for
successful coexistence will be better if we start from a position of mutual respect.”).
302. Id. (arguing that genuine legitimacy “has profound implications for the dignity of
virtual world communities. If we feel comfortable saying that the internal perspective
shows us a genuine community, that community’s consensuses seem more just. Which is
to say that when it comes time for that community to make requests of other communities,
it stands on that much firmer a footing.”).
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ties, where appropriate, and prevent the granting of injunctive relief or
specific performance for rules that are unfair in all the circumstances.
Accordingly, we see that Blizzard has a relatively strong claim against
In Game Dollar. Blizzard has taken one of the strongest stances of all
virtual world providers against RMT, and it would be fair to say that,
even if the majority of players do not internalize the prohibition on RMT,
they know and understand that they may be punished for buying or
selling gold.303 The prohibition against spamming is likely to be even
more accepted. This is not a case where the rule exists in the EULA but
is not enforced in practice–Blizzard has regularly suspended the
accounts of those participants it finds advertising commercial services
in the game.304 While the restriction on spamming is a restriction on
speech, it does not raise significant concerns, at least in this case–it is
an effective rule that is imposed to protect the community, and seems to
accord with community values. From a rule of law perspective, then, the
prohibition appears legitimate–it is sufficiently well-known and accepted
to be consensual, and it does not appear to offend any substantive rights
of participants.
On the other hand, an injunction should not be available to prevent a
participant from breaching a contractual term that has only been
sporadically enforced.305 If, for example, a court were to find that
Blizzard was not strict in policing RMT or commercial advertising, but
had instead tacitly encouraged gold farming through their game
mechanics, then it would not be equitable to grant an injunction against
a company like In Game Dollar. Similarly, in cases like Mr. Bungle’s,
where the rules are ill-defined and no community consensus exists about
what types of griefing are permissible, injunctive relief would probably
not be justified. In these circumstances, any claim would have to be
303. See DURANSKE, supra note 79, at 37.
304. See Gold Buying, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/bas
ics/antigold.html; Daniel Terdiman,World of Warcraft Bans Raise Players’ Ire, CNETNEWS
(Mar. 22, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/World-of-Warcraft-bans-raise-players
ire/2100-1043_3-6169517.html.
305. If a contract term is not enforced by the provider against a particular participant
in knowledge of breach, it may be waived against later breaches. See, e.g., Burger King
Corp. v. Family Dining, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 187, § 40.4. On the other hand, if the contract term is not enforced
generally in the community to the extent that participants come to rely on its not being
enforced, the provider may be estopped from terminating a subscriber’s access for breach.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 119, § 90; see also Burk, supra note
3 (“If the proprietor appears to have acquiesced in the activity, and players have come to
rely on the game proprietor’s inaction as tacit acceptance of the practice, that may
constitute a defense to legal claims against the user.”).
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based upon compensating actual damages under contract, if it could
proceed at all.
If the equitable jurisdiction is exercisable in such a way that courts
are able to support the enforcement of community rules where they
would otherwise not be enforceable but to simultaneously distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate rules and processes, the contractual
governance model will likely be, on the whole, suitable for the resolution
of vertical disputes between participants and providers. The core
limitation of the contractual model is that it mainly provides compensa-
tory remedies that are largely inappropriate for securing ongoing
compliance with community rules. With the support of equitable
remedies in the small proportion of cases in which they are needed, we
avoid the need to search within other (more alienating) criminal or
private law doctrines for a punitive effect. The main limitation to this
approach is that it may be difficult for courts to determine when rules
are legitimate or not; the constitutive values of the rule of law frame-
work, however, seem to provide a useful guide to this evaluation which
should ensure both that community governance can be effective and that
the state does not support abuses of power by providers.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sketched some of the normative implications of
applying a rule of law based interpretative framework to the legal
disputes that arise around the enforcement of community rules. In
doing so, there is a significant disconnect, and a sense of artifice, in
taking a predominantly legal approach to ongoing governance processes
that only rarely result in legal action. The greatest majority of disputes
about enforcing rules in virtual communities arise and are settled within
the community through technological barriers, social norms, and the
agency of the provider and its customer service team. The prospect of
legal remedies is only explicitly invoked when these other, more direct,
forms of governance break down or are rendered ineffective. Neverthe-
less, each of these forms of governance operates within a limiting
framework created by territorial law, and the remedies that are
available at law change the conditions for the exercise of power within
the community. For this reason, a sound normative basis for under-
standing the competing tensions in legal disputes provides an important
constraint on the power of the provider,306 an understanding of the
ways in which internal governance can be supported, and an outline of
an argument for external enforcement of internal rules.
306. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 148-50.
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The biggest conclusion to be drawn from this framework is that the
lack of guarantees of legitimacy in private governance means that it is
wholly inappropriate for territorial states to impose punishments for
breach of community rules. In making this point, it is important to
distinguish among wrongs committed that are already legitimately
prohibited by the state, acts that represent wrongs but are merely
fictional depictions of wrongs, and acts that are wrongful only when
understood through the interpretative lens of community norms. It is
this third category that presents the most theoretical difficulty for
territorial enforcement, as it falls outside of the established dichotomy
between virtual and real wrongs. For this third category of wrongs, we
can see that the imposition of state-backed punitive sanctions is likely
to be illegitimate because they have not been legitimately created by the
state. Nevertheless, this category of wrongs must be enforceable in some
way if communities are to develop with some autonomy, and states may
need to assist in their enforcement without imposing punitive sanctions.
To allow virtual communities to flourish, we should retain the
contractual framework, as it is more likely to be able to identify and
take into account the social norms of the community than other existing
private law doctrines. If it is to do so, however, not only should
contractual doctrine and contractual agreements be interpreted in a
manner informed by rule of law governance values, but the remedies
available for breach of community rules must be sensitive to the needs
of the community and legitimacy of the rules in question. The contractu-
al framework should accordingly support internal community governance
where (a) the rules are legitimate and (b) the community is otherwise
unable to satisfactorily address the wrong internally. The recommenda-
tions of this article are threefold: (1) breach of internal community rules
should not be directly punishable by territorial criminal law or by
private law such as copyright; (2) equitable relief should be available
where community governance is unable to adequately address wrongdo-
ing; and (3) the grant of equitable relief should be limited to circum-
stances where the rule is legitimately created and the punishment
legitimately imposed. The contractual framework will be able to
satisfactorily address governance tensions to the extent that it is able to
provide these remedies and distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate rules and punishments. If it cannot, we may need to search
for other, more formalized, legal structures to regulate ongoing
community governance, measures which may have a greater negative
impact on community autonomy.
